"The post-revolutionary rethinking of arid land policy in Ethiopia"

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Pastoralists are powerless groups of people in every state in Africa. It follows from this, that they are marginalized politically, stigmatized culturally and, because their use of natural resources is considered irrational, their resource base is encroached upon for alternative uses. The reverse of this scenario must be made possible if there is to be any chance that pastoralists will be empowered. An alternative perspective would enable them to control their own resources and use their cultures, officially and effectively.

The empowerment of pastoralists is possible if a combination of circumstances is created which contributes to their emancipation. Two of these circumstances were fulfilled in Ethiopia in the late 1980’s. First, for decades pastoralists have waged their own liberation struggle, alone and in cooperation with the urban elites and peasants, for their own autonomy and for democracy. Second, as in other African states responding in part to international pressures, there are trends towards democratization and the observance of human rights; there are instances where group rights (in this case, referring to pastoral groups as nationalities) have now been accorded. Ethiopian pastoralists are now empowered, primarily as a result of their own liberation struggles, the liberation struggle of the urban elites and peasants, and, to a limited extent, external influences which exerted pressure for democracy. This paper attempts to show that, as a result of such empowerment, a reverse status-building process is taking place in the political life of Ethiopian pastoralists.

The significance and place of arid land and pastoral communities within Ethiopian society

The area which is considered to be arid (and semi-arid) includes 61% of Ethiopia’s territory. This zone lies in the lowlands — below 1,500 meters of altitude, which receive only 400 mm of rain annually and are characterized by hotness and harshness (bera). In this area, which encircles the country, fifteen pastoral groups or roughly 10% of the Ethiopian population make their livelihood.

Three basic facts about pastoralism have a persistent impact on the relationship between pastoralists and the state. First, the fact that pastoralists encircle the country has implications for the survival of Ethiopian independence; and on the other hand this also has implications in terms of the pastoralists’ own political support for the liberation struggle. Second, consider the fact that 90% of the population uses 40% of the territory while 10% has at its disposal 60% of the area. And finally, consider the fact that fifteen national groups
(roughly 20% of all groups legally recognized now in Ethiopia) are pastoral, the implication of which is the formidable problem of attempting to assimilate or integrate them, while at the same re-organizing their social structures.

Ethiopian pastoral groups vary in size and in the way they have adapted to modernity and modern states. Generally speaking, those in the North, East and South East are used to operating within the international arena, in terms of trade, politics and warfare. Their relationships with the state have been both cooperative and/or conflicting. But those in the South and South West have had limited relations with, and have not posed any serious threat to, the Ethiopian state.

An old scenario: the origins of pastoralist marginalization

The effective incorporation of Ethiopian pastoralists — through conquest — into the nation-state is only 100 years old. The Ethiopian state, based in the central highlands and tracing its origin from King Solomon via the Queen of Sheba, Orthodox Christianity and literocracy, was a formidable entity continuously expanding its empire and attempting to assimilate, without any qualms, those whom it caught within its orbit.

This regional super-power was successful only to a limited extent in consolidating its empire, due to the fact that only during the last century did Ethiopia achieve some control over those it had conquered and integrated into the nation-state. Three factors prevented the intended assimilation: war and conflict as a result of “push” and “pull” factors; a paucity of infrastructure and social services provided to marginal regions, due to lack of industrialization and poor economic development; and, the assertion of indepen-

dence and strong identity maintenance on the part of pastoralists.

The political system of the nation-state did not penetrate deeply into the pastoral clan system, as it did in the peasant areas of the central highlands, for the imperial elites lacked sufficient knowledge, strategy and determination to accomplish this. Dergue (The Marxist-Military Government which ruled Ethiopia from 1974–1991) tried in a rush to impose the socialist model of peasant associations on Ethiopian pastoralists, but it remained on paper only.

The social and infrastructural services which have been established in pastoral areas during the last 100 years are minimal to nil. Development interventions, which generally consisted of two types of programs, have been seen primarily from the point of government interest. The first type of development activity involved mechanized farming and the formation of game reserves, which encroached on pastoral grazing territory, in some cases depriving the pastoralists of their prime grazing land, with devastating consequences for pastoral production. The Afar in Northeast Ethiopia have been an exemplary target for this kind of development policy (See Ayele’s paper). During the last three decades the Afar lost about 50,000 ha of prime grazing land without adequate compensation, and as a result were rendered vulnerable to drought and declining production, as well as being dislocated in relation to their pastoral production system.

The second type of major planned interventions in the pastoralist (arid and semi-arid) lands from 1960 up to the present consists mainly of the implementation of three projects in three regions, costing a total of 240 million birr borrowed through the World Bank. The first and second projects, which tar-
tended the Somali and Boran regions, were intended to establish stock routes. But the third, which was the only one actually implemented, was planned differently, for the provision of stock ponds, roads, veterinary services, training and range management.

The project did not live up to its intended objectives, for either the pastoralists or the government. Where they were carried out, as in the Boran region, environmental degradation can be detected, due to lack of control over overall project activities.

Judging from the way pastoralists are handled, political, economic, social and cultural marginalization was inevitable. The pastoralists were seen by policy makers as irrational and backward, in terms of their mode of adaptation to their environment, their socio-political organization and their culture. There was no improvement in such perception when modern urban elites were in power. This was mainly due to the fact that indigenous knowledge regarding pastoralists was not generated and disseminated to the elites who manned the bureaucracy and whose backgrounds were either urban or peasant. As well, the pastoralists did not have as much interaction with urban culture and so did not become acculturated, as did the peasants of the central highlands. Thus, the marginalization of pastoralists was total from every perspective. What emerged out of this matrix of ignorance of pastoral systems was the view that the economic adaptation, the land tenure system, and the system of socio-political organization of the pastoralists were invalid, and hence not instrumental for the development of pastoralists. The capabilities of the arid and semi-arid lands were also inadequately known. One often hears some ignorant policy-maker stating that there is plenty of land out there which is not settled.

Though in very general terms, all previous governments had similar approaches to arid lands and pastoralists citizens of the nation, two important policies were made during the reigns of the late Emperor Haile Selassie and Derge (led by Mengistu Haile Mariam).

Haile Selassie’s government dispossessed the pastoralists of their grazing territory outright. The revised constitution of 1955, article 130 sub-section (d) stated that:

All property not held and possessed in the name of any person, natural or juridical, including all land in escrow and all abandoned properties, whether real or personal, as well as, all products of the sub-soil, all forests and all grazing lands, water courses, lakes and territorial waters, are State Domain.

It is clear from the above that pastoralist had no rights over their grazing territory and this rendered the pastoral territory open to anyone for the taking. The dispossess of their grazing land was not only a matter of perception, but firmly based in the national constitution; the symbolic significance of this is experienced as the loss of citizenship or, at the very least lower status than the average citizens of the country.

Warfare in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia

The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie by a military junta, after decades of social upheaval and demands for socio-economic reform for the Ethiopian masses, ushered in a new era of turmoil, war, dislocation, great human rights abuses and destruction of property throughout the country for some 17 years (1974–1991). Pastoralists have had their share in all these. In fact, one could say that pastoralists have had
more than their share of war and its consequences: drought, famine and dislocation. Most of the major wars were initiated and fought by pastoralists in the arid lands of Ethiopia. There were four wars fought in pastoral areas, involving the Afar, Somali, Beni Amir, Tigre, Soho, Reshaida and Boran. The only groups not involved in these wars were the Gamo Gofa pastoral groups.

The first war, the Afar war, fought during the first year of the revolution, lasted a few months. The Dergue’s objective in the war was to free Afar society from its traditional Sultanate leadership, and come to control the people. Apparently, the Sultanate resisted. However, the Dergue succeeded in driving out the Sultan by mobilizing opposition within the society and by using superior arms. This was only a temporary relief for the Dergue because the Sultan continued his war from outside.

The second war in a pastoral area was the continuation and escalation of the Somali war, which reached its peak in 1978. The object of the war was to detach the Somali region from Ethiopia and amalgamate it to the “Greater Somalia”. To achieve this objective, Somalia initiated conflict from the very beginning of her independence in the early 1960s, mobilizing the Ethiopian Somalis. But in the late 1970s Somalia’s preparedness to wage war on Ethiopia reached a new level, with Somalia well armed and trained through the assistance of the then Soviet Union. As planned, Somalia invaded Ethiopia at a time when the Dergue was waging a class war throughout the country and was therefore additionally vulnerable. Had it not been for the switch-over of the Soviet Union to the Ethiopian side, which redressed the arms imbalance, and the mobilization of 300,000 new recruits to the militia army, the war would not have ended as quickly as it did. The war, as big as it was, was fought primarily in the Ogaden area, but also spilled over into the Borana area.

The third pastoral area which was afflicted by war was Eritrea, which experienced a thirty-year civil war with Ethiopia. The Eritrean war of liberation started in the pastoralists areas, i.e. the Beni-Amir, Tigre, Reshaida and Soho regions, under the name of Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the forerunner of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), which was centred mainly in the Highland Region. Now, the EPLF has won independence for Eritrea and this was confirmed by referendum. But the effects of the destruction of property and the dislocation of the Eritrean peoples, too well known to the world to describe here, continue to be felt.

The fourth area of Ethiopian pastoralism which had some involvement in war was the region of the Nuer, as a result of the “spill-over” from the Southern Sudanese War, which was supported by the Dergue. The influx of refugees to the Ethiopian region of the Nuer and the involvement by the population in the war created havoc in the area.

The destruction of property and dislocation of people that has been brought upon pastoralists who dwell in arid and semi-arid areas of Ethiopia has been vast and, coupled with drought has rendered these pastoral peoples vulnerable to eventual famine, starvation and death.

The Dergue’s attempt at reorganizing pastoralists

The second kind of encounter between the Dergue and pastoralists involved attempts to take the “revolution” into the pastoral region by waging a class war, recruiting cadres and reorganizing the countryside. The Dergue failed to
achieve the goal of reorganizing pastoralists, due to the on-going war described above, but the far-reaching reason for its failure was the apparent unsuitability of a peasant-derived model of organization for pastoralists.

The Dergue's Rural Land Proclamation of 1975 nationalized all land and gave pastoralists, like all other citizens, possessory rights over the land they customarily used for grazing. But Dergue decided that the decision about arid land use would remain pending, and stated explicitly that a final decision regarding the arid lands would be made within five years.

What this pending decision about arid land tenure would be, became very clear in the course of time. In 1982 Dergue resolved to settle all pastoral nomads. The rational for Dergue's plan for pastoral development was clear. From the very beginning Dergue tried to benefit from its own propaganda regarding the plight of pastoralists, in the phrases — our compatriots "who follow the tails of their cows" (meaning, aimless wanderers who do not plan their movements rationally) and "those who languish in backward socio-economic stages, we must liberate from such backwardness." Several times, the Dergue made representatives of pastoral groups and shifting cultivators march on parade in the revolution square on public holidays. The leaders of the Dergue also toured the arid region with the aim of effecting political, cultural and economic change. But the immediate aim was to extract livestock; it was able with some success to air-lift small-stock for export. But the paramount aim of the Dergue was — in line with its view that the pastoral mode of production was a lower stage of development — to settle and organize pastoralists according to the model of socialist peasant organization. Transfor-
Isolation, antagonism and warfare: an assessment of pastoralists’ relations to the state

Isolation, antagonism and war have characterized pastoralists’ relations to the Ethiopian state. The are four root causes which have aggravated these relations: (1) ignorance of the policy makers regarding pastoralists; (2) the chauvinism of policy makers; (3) disparities of development; (4) encroachment on the pastoralists’ grazing territories.

The first cause of the problem of policy regarding pastoralism and arid lands has been miscalculation due to ignorance of the pastoralist habitat and mode of production. There has been no instance in Ethiopian history when a carefully planned national scheme of pastoral development got off the ground. The concern with arid lands has been primarily for the use of its resources and control over pastoralists.

The urban elite and government officials have historically been obsessed with national integration and modernization. As in the case of peasants, the mode of production and culture of pastoralists was not considered worth studying; it was assumed that these would disappear with the inevitable adoption of a modern mode of existence. There was never sufficient interest to seriously consider using anthropological and sociological knowledge and information to better understand pastoralists.

Policy makers were not prone to taking seriously conflicts which emanated from pastoral areas, or to seek rational solutions to them. Intermittent conflicts were deemed as naturally characteristic of the pastoralists, due to their warlike nature. Thus, physical control through armed force, was the main mechanism for containing the pastoralist within the realm of the “nation-state”.

The second source of conflict was the chauvinistic attitude of the urban and ruling elite towards pastoralists. The urban elite, who considered themselves “civilized”, had a lower opinion of the peasants and pastoralists. Their tolerance and sympathy came only from the hope that the latter soon would transform themselves through education.

The third source of conflict between the pastoralists and the state was a disparity of development in pastoral areas compared with the rest of the country, and lack of infrastructure and social services in pastoral areas. It must have been apparent to any pastoralist that, though he paid his share of taxes, his share of modern amenities was almost nil. And it is very difficult to assume that pastoralists were blind to such extreme disparities in levels of development, for they have also had a degree of urban experience and travel, and have a small representation among the urban elites, all of which must have contributed to an awareness of this injustice. Pastoralists were often given false promises by high state officials, which they must have viewed with increasing suspicion.

The fourth source of conflict was encroachment on their shrinking habitat. The Afar and Somali regions have been encroached upon extensively by commercial farming and peasant agriculture. However, it is the Afar production system which has been most drastically affected. This situation must have been aggravated by the increase of human and livestock population in recent times.

Pastoralists have been in conflict with the Ethiopian state for these and other reasons from time immemorial. Various conflicts, from intermittent to constant, have sometimes escalated into all-out war. Historically, the most notable was the invasion of the Ethiopian
state and the usurpation of its power by Ahmed Gragn, who led the Afar and Somali armies to seize state power during the 16th century. Neighbouring states and the Middle Eastern Muslim World have had a hand in such conflicts and wars; Northern, Eastern, and Southeastern pastoralists are Muslims themselves and have had religious interactions, as well as trade relations with them.

Because of the marginalization of pastoralists for reasons mentioned above, as well as their persecution as Muslims, European and Arab invaders have found easy collaborators in these pastoralists when they have sought to invade the central Ethiopian state.

However the Ethiopian state has been able to maintain an upper hand over the pastoralists because of its ability to organize the army and import superior arms. Pastoralists became the backbone of ethnic and regional liberation movements only during the last thirty years, when they were able to better arm themselves and when the urban elites and peasants also rose against the state in collusion with them. While intensive struggle and war for ethnic liberation and democratization took place throughout the whole country during this period, major wars also occurred in the following pastoral regions: Somali, Afar, Beni Amir, Tigre, Saho and Reshaida. The pastoralists participated widely in these dissident movements, even though their role has been misunderstood and depreciated.

Towards the empowerment of pastoralists: post-revolutionary rethinking of arid land policy in Ethiopia

Overcentralization, attempts at forced homogenization, lack of democratization and violation of human rights had only created war, conflict, instability, poverty and famine in Ethiopia. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the liberating forces and their collaborators, including pastoralists, fought for radical political changes. These political changes contained three essential elements: democracy, the respect of universal human rights and self-determination of “national/nationalities” (ethnic groups). Rewarding for the pastoralists is the fact that as “nationalities” they have been put on equal footing with all ethnic groups (nationalities), irrespective of their previous political positions. The Charter of the Transitional Government puts this principle succinctly as follows:

The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed. To this end, each nation, nationality and people is guaranteed the right to:

(a) Preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and develop its language;

(b) Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation;

(c) Exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned nation/ nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated.

This article puts all Ethiopian ethnie groups on an equal footing; it provides for the use of their cultures, including the use of their languages in education and regional administration, the administration of their own affairs, control of their own resources, and finally, it gives ethnic groups defined as a “nationality” the right to form their own states, if it is determined that the nationality’s interests are being trampled upon and there
is no other solution for its grievance. Translating this policy into decisive action has meant redistributing power and implementing serious principles of democratic and human rights in all sectors of the population. This in effect has involved a restructuring of the Ethiopian state according to federalistic principles. The pastoralists were able to participate from the very beginning in the central decision-making structure, at both state and district levels. Initially, the fact that some five political organizations (nine seats) of pastoral peoples joined the Council of Representatives to form council (the equivalent of parliament), ensured the playing of such a role, and their participation at the centre was insured.

Further empowerment followed with the federal restructuring of the political system, in which two pastoral groups, namely the Afar and Somali, attained statehood. At the same time, the Borana and pastoralists in Gamo Gofa, Gambela and Tigre gained the status of districts (Wereda).

Federalism means that states and counties are empowered to administer their own units, collect taxes, initiate and manage development projects and control their own resources. The states and districts are also empowered to make their own laws, appoint and dismiss judges and recruit, train, hire, and dismiss policemen.

In sum, in the Ethiopian Transitional Government, the pastoralists are as clearly and equally empowered as any other Ethiopian nationality (ethnic group). This is expressed in the first place by the fact that the pastoralists are fairly represented in the central government, in which they constitute 13% of the Council of Representative’s seats. Secondly, pastoralists, as states and districts, would have sufficient autonomy to develop their own human and natural resources. Thirdly, as nationality groups, there has been a recognition of their cultural diversity and the uses of it; and finally, fair distribution of scarce resources, i.e. equivalent administrative costs, have already been effected. But modern development projects are awaiting planning and implementation in pastoral areas.

Problems of development management

There are four major problems which could emanate from the new situation: organization of the state bureaucracy, integration between the state sector and the pastoral sector, problems of economic and cultural development, and, lastly, pressure which will be put upon pastoral resources from outside.

The setting up of viable and autonomous pastoral states (klli) and districts (wereda) requires serious consideration. First, there is the consideration of competence and manpower to organize a modern federal state which functions as an integral part of the federation and is able to process federal policies and laws within its own realm. There is also the requirement of legislating local laws and issuing directives for various activities. For all these functions, highly trained and experienced bureaucrats from among the pastoralists are required.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of state and district formation in pastoral areas is the establishment of a working relationship between the state bureaucracy and pastoral social organization, which could be considered as “civic society”. The harmonization of the pastoral “state” and “civic society” may be difficult because of differences in the principles of organization and orientation of the actors. In the decision-making process and regarding methods
of social control, unless the two sectors harmonize, conflict is most likely to occur. A balance of power between the state bureaucracy and the pastoral system has to be struck, otherwise as in the old scenario mutual distrust and isolation is likely to occur.

In such a dynamic process the development of social conflict will be inevitable. In this context the “urban elite”, who have had some schooling and an appropriate orientation towards the operation of the bureaucracy, would have obvious advantages for occupying state offices. The incumbents of such offices are likely to exaggerate their own knowledge and denigrate the ability of their traditional pastoral kinsmen. The legacies of feudalism and “scientific socialism”, which had some representation in the pastoral region through the authorities of Sultanates and clan leaders, may retard democratic processes, leaving a concentration of power and wealth in the hands of few. Socio-political incompatibility between the state bureaucracy and the segmentary system is likely to continue unless the concepts and skills of how to play the democratic political game, and the limits of power, are acquired soon.

Polarization between the urban elite — who would man the bureaucracy — and traditional pastoralists can be avoided, since the former, coming from pastoral societies, maintain insights into the issues affecting pastoralists, even though they may be in a hurry to adopt modern forms of organization. A modus vivendi will be arrived at, which will be a “proper” mix between the new and the old, insuring a greater say for the pastoralists and providing proper checks and balances.

The third problem area is the development issue, which has to be handled by understanding the needs and demands of pastoralism. A development strategy which takes its departure from accurate knowledge of the nature of arid lands and the needs and aspiration of the pastoralists is imperative. Development schemes would be appropriate and sustainable if the fragile nature of the arid land ecosystem that pastoralists inhabit was considered; if adventuristic and destructive intrusion by outsiders into the pastoral area were prevented; if appropriate compensation for those pastoralists who are already under crisis were attempted; and if attempts to reverse ecological degradation were undertaken.

Finally, the pressure on pastoral land in Ethiopia should be taken into consideration. Consider the situation of Ethiopia. The facts are that 90% of the Ethiopian population is confined to 40% of the territory of the country, which has been degraded by millennia of erroneous methods of exploitation. Add to this the fact that fifteen river valleys, whose irrigable land is scarcely utilized, are deemed as the future area of agricultural expansion. Such irrigable land is equatable with the pastoralists’ prime grazing land, which raises serious issues. The solution to this conflict of interest requires a deep understanding of the problems involved, and equitable sharing of resources.

Conclusion

The incorporation of pastoralists into the Ethiopian nation state did not result in their assimilation or integration, because the state lacked the appropriate political strategy and the economic capacity to achieve these. Attempts at controlling pastoralists by sheer force, while cultural stigmatization and socio-economic marginalization continued, only led to conflicts, war and liberation struggle. The liberation struggle of the pastoralists bore fruit in
the late 1980s, when local struggles became a universal struggle for nationality, identity and self-determination, as well as for democracy. Pastoralists, as part of the liberation forces, were able to participate in the formulation of new social, political and economic policy which brought them into equitable relations with other sectors of the Ethiopian state. This political modus operandi is likely to continue, for former attempts to assimilate and integrate Ethiopia’s vast number of ethnic groups have completely failed. Provision of democracy, partnership, participation, identity and regional autonomy for these ethnic groups have now become a sine qua non for the very existence of the Ethiopian state.

The instrument of political empowerment of Ethiopian pastoralists is a federal system in which they form two of the ten states and more than a dozen districts. The challenge should now be faced by pastoralists, who must organize their modern states and districts, operating as an integral part of the federal system, and manage their own development.

The challenge from the viewpoint of the federation is to enable pastoralists to handle their own political affairs and manage their own development activities, while insuring their effective participation in national life. The second most important challenge of the central government is to utilize rationally the vast resources of the arid lands for the mutual benefit of pastoralists and of the nation as a whole.

Notes

1 By this is meant, for example, the use of the local vernacular as the medium of instruction, which has now been made possible in Ethiopia.

2 Regarding the survey, this paper takes Eritrea as though it was still part of Ethiopia, even though the policies of the two governments concerning pastoralists do not precisely accord.

3 1 US $ = 2.07 Ethiopian birr (1993).

4 In a general meeting of COPWE (The Commission to Organize the Party of Workers of Ethiopia) a declaration was made to settle all pastoral nomads at once. A committee of which I was the chairman was organized to draft a plan. But there was no general knowledge about arid land and pastoralists to go by. Therefore, I and my team were assigned to carry out a two year field work study of pastoralists in Ethiopia.

5 Inspiration for this came from the Chinese model of peasant organization and development of cooperatives. In Ethiopia peasants living within a 800 ha area were forcibly organized into one peasant association. Over fifty thousand peasant association had been formed by the end of 1970s. Towards the end of the 1980s there was forced villagization which meant the scattered homestead were demolished and new huts were built in clusters, lined up like a military parade. Although the Dergue went around the pastoral areas to impose such model, it remained only on paper.

6 The paucity of infrastructure and social services clearly shows a complete neglect of the pastoral areas. In our survey of the RRC/UNDP project, these were almost negligible.

7 Ahmed Gragn was a leader of the Afar and the Somali. He invaded the Ethiopian State and usurped power for about fifteen years.
All ethnic groups are called either a nation or a nationality as an operational political definition and for empowerment during this transitional period.

The Charter serves as a constitution for the transitional period.

There are ten such states, referred to as regions (killil).

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