"State Formation and Encapsulation of Nomads: Local Change and Continuity Among Recently Sedentarized Bedouin in Jordan"

Joseph M. Hiatt

Nomadic Peoples, Number 15, April 1984
STATE FORMATION AND THE ENCAPSULATION OF NOMADS:
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AMONG RECENTLY SEDENTARIZED BEDOUIN IN JORDAN
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This paper concerns the experience of nomads unaccustomed to governmental control who suddenly found themselves living within a new state; specifically it deals with the Khreisha lineage of the Beni Sakhr bedouin tribe who were encapsulated within the Amirate of Transjordan and became sedentarized in what later emerged as the Kingdom of Jordan. The formation of the state and the encapsulation were partial, though important, contributors to the onset of sedentarization and other changes which those bedouin experienced. Additional forces were involved, some more immediately and even with dire effect, and the following discussion attempts to give proper perspective to their role. I begin with remarks on the concept of encapsulation to suggest more readily what happened to the Khreisha following the establishment of the Amirate under the British Mandate in 1921. Next, I reconstruct briefly the likely form of the bedouin socio-political organization and of their nomadic economic system before the formation of the state. Then I turn to that formation and the encapsulation of the Khreisha and discuss changes influenced by the impact of state agencies and policies on the bedouin, including sedentarization. Finally, I touch on changes and continuities in the authority and leadership structure which have emerged from the sedentarized state of Khreisha.

Encapsulation and the Khreisha experience

Anthropologists have recognized and investigated the process of encapsulation as such for only a short period of time. Frederick Bailey's discussion of it in his Strategems and Spoils (1969:147-8) seems to be the earliest by one of our number and it is still quite useful. According to him, all instances of encapsulation share the characteristic feature that one political structure engulfs another, smaller one. Where the cases differ is in the nature of events following the encapsulation; and Bailey identifies three types: (1) simple enclosure within the boundaries of the larger structure which does not or cannot interfere with the smaller; (2) enclosure with predation, the encapsulating structure interfering only as necessary to ensure the continued outflow of some resource; and (3) enclosure with the policy that the subordinate structure must be assimilated. Actually Bailey misses one useful type, which would fit between (1) and (2), that is enclosure with interference, resulting in changes within the smaller structure but no extraction of resources from it.

Reality does not always match theory, of course, and is not nearly as static, and it may happen that an encapsulating entity fails to sustain a policy, such as one of those types, or for some reason experiences a shift between circumstances similar to two or more of them. The latter occurred in Transjordan where government actions initially fluctuated between policies similar to type (1) and my interpolated type; and some individuals in the new administration would even have preferred to force bedouin into
settlements. Yet in balance, administrative policy during the Amirate and later in the Kingdom had the apparent intent of letting the bedouin retain their nomadic pastoral existence as they wished, and allowed for rendering them assistance in difficult periods, for example during the droughts which overtook the country in the 1930's and later. In more recent years, the situation has changed as most of the bedouin have become sedentarized and have either joined the army or taken salaried jobs, and they have increasingly adopted urban-oriented activities and values.

Traditional bedouin organization and economy

The Khreisha, as members of the Beni Sakhr, belong to one of the most eminent and respected tribes of Jordan. The tribe is segmentary in make up, subdivided into lineal and familial groups somewhat as described in the basic literature on such structures; although it also exhibits inconsistencies, such as Emrys Peters observed among the Cyrenaican bedouin of Libya (1960). The tribe is accephalous and structurally incapable of creating and maintaining a permanent office of tribal head, that is, one that exists independently of its occupant. During its history, tribal and subtribal sheikhs have emerged into recognition and attracted clients and other adherents because of their individual wisdom, generosity, strength of following, and other characteristics. If such individuals ceased to display those qualities or died, their followers might remain, adhering to another family member, or melt away but in any case would most likely seek out new benefactors.

Certain lineages or other subdivisions of the tribe could develop reputations as sheikly groups by consistently producing outstanding and honorable personalities with leadership abilities. Such was the case with the Khreisha, although not at the level of the entire tribe. The Beni Sakhr are divided into two main parts, what I have elsewhere called clans (1981), the Twaq' and the Ka'abna, and tribal leadership has rested for at least a century with the former, whereas the Khreisha belong to the latter. It is at the subtribal level that the Khreisha have exercised leadership.

Besides their reputation as a lineage of sheiks, the Khreisha have enjoyed a longstanding prestige which arose from their belonging to a powerful camel-herding tribe, one of the so-called 'noble' bedouin tribes. The camel carried more prestige value than the sheep among desert bedouin, who distinguished between those who owned camels and those who merely owned and herded sheep. The Khreisha, of course, needed sheep-meat and wool, and these they obtained from client shepherding tribes in return for acts of protection and assistance in time of drought or other hardship. Such herding tribes would be among the adherents of strong tribes mentioned above. As for the Khreisha, in view of their standing among Transjordanian bedouin, it is unlikely that they ever engaged in shepherding.

Now we come to the economy of the Khreisha which, until the years of encapsulation within the new state, had camel-herding at its center with several other sources of income mixed in. For livestock raising without benefit of fodder or feed substitutes, the pastoralist needs pasturage and water for his herds; he also needs land on which these resources can be found in sufficient abundance and distribution for him to move his animals during the year from grazed out areas to fresh pasture with adequate water supplies. The Beni Sakhr, over the course of several centuries,
established just such a tribal territory, lying in what is the northern half of the current Kingdom of Jordan and stretching from the mountainous rim of the Jordan Valley on the west into the north Arabian desert in what is today Saudi Arabia in the east.

In broadest terms, their traditional use of that territory and its resources year after year took the following pattern: in the winter season they migrated to the eastern part of their territory where the land dips down into an extensive valley system (the Wadi Sirhan). Rain trapped on the valley floor soaked into the ground and usually yielded them excellent pasturage; numerous deep wells dotting the upper edge of the valley and claimed by the bedouin assured them of ample water; and the valley depression sheltered them and their livestock against severe winter winds. With the arrival of spring the bedouin moved back westward out of the desert and to the edge of the populated zone where rainfall was normally greater and agriculture was practiced. During years of good rainfall they could move across the intervening desert and steppe in a leisurely, irregular path; but when rain was scarce they would need to cross their territory quickly to take advantage of any pasturage and puddles of standing water which might have appeared in the temperate zone following the winter season. Man-made pools and naturally-occurring underground cavities which catch rain run-off, along with a few streams among the western hills, provided other water sources. As for pasturage when resources were poor, the bedouin resorted to supplies extracted from peasant cultivators.

As bedouin pastoralists, the Khreisha produced only part of the food and goods they used. They neither grew barley, wheat, or other crops, produced tea, worked metal, nor engaged in other activities necessary to meet some of their basic needs. It was not that the practice of agriculture and other activities requiring fixed locations would have been inconvenient vocations for them to undertake as nomads: cases of cultivating nomads are known from Iran and elsewhere. Rather the bedouin scorned sedentary peoples and all aspects of their existence, such as agriculture and manual labor. (pace Kazziha 1972:18). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman government tried, for example, to bribe the Khreisha into settling down with offers of landownership, and those nomads refused on the grounds that it would make them like peasants. Traces of this contempt, in fact, are evident today. To get items they could not, or would not, produce the Beni Sakhir traded for them, usually in better protected towns that had the larger markets; and when possible they extorted the goods from peasants or simply raided and took them.

The practice of extortion actually worked like a protection racket. The bedouin presented a perpetual threat of raiding to the settled cultivators who, having invested themselves in their crops, were tied to their fields and immobile. The bedouin exploited those inflexible circumstances by agreeing not to raid the peasants' villages and fields and to protect them against other bedouin marauders in return for payment of tribute in the form of goods and food. Indeed, the Khreisha and other Beni Sakhir subgroups were able in this way to control a number of peasant villages almost as feudal fiefs, and they even spoke, and still do speak, of those relationships as 'owning' the villages. (The bedouin, incidentally, did not always have the upper hand in these situations as indicated by stories of townspeople becoming resentful at the state of affairs, hiding their best goods, and paying their tribute with material of inferior quality. (Hiatt 1981:54)).
Raiding, the other element of the Beni Sakhr economy, was carried out against other bedouin, villages and farms, and even government-sponsored religious caravans. Unless the raid was part of a blood feud and an act of warfare, killing was to be avoided, the aim being the taking of booty, and from bedouin tribes that often meant theft of livestock. In this instance the raid served a crucial economic function for nomadic pastoralists. In times of drought animal stock are vulnerable and can die off quickly and at high rates; theft of stock can deplete herds too. Rebuilding the herd through animal reproduction takes too long, but raiding is a ready means of instantly regaining mature animals in order to sustain a pastoral enterprise (cf. Sweet 1965).

There in summary form, then, are the traditional tribal structure and the economy of the Khreisha reconstructed from historical evidence and from interviews with those bedouin and other members of their tribe. The Khreisha continued as nomadic pastoralists throughout the 1940's and into the 1950's when the first of them began settling down at a site on the edge of the Jordanian desert. By that time, and with some governmental encouragement, they had adopted agriculture to the extent that they had peasants cultivating plots of land in their territory; they had accepted landownership in principle and practice; and they had given up herding camels for the less prestigious sheep. They were also serving in the national army and had similarly acknowledged the authority of the central government in a number of other ways. Many features of their traditional structure are still evident; however, their existence has undergone numerous social, economic, and political changes. Presently, I will focus on political features and describe how governmental offices encroached upon the Khreisha settlement, and their impact on the sheikh's authority. First, however, I want to discuss the state formation and to note changes in the Khreisha economy and value system which followed their encapsulation, linking those bedouin closely to the new government.

Elsewhere I show that under Ottoman rule the Khreisha and other Transjordanian bedouin were never encapsulated and were not even under administrative control (1981). Rather, I believe that it is reasonable to mark the beginning of the process leading to their encapsulation from the end of the Turkish empire in 1917 and the removal of its territorial claim upon Transjordan, followed by the establishment of the British Mandate Commission in 1921 and the creation under its aegis of the Amirate of Transjordan. These were distinct events, yet they happened closely together, all directly affected the manner in which Transjordan would be administered, and they therefore may be seen as part of a single, larger complex development. Under Ottoman suzerainty, Transjordan had been on the outer edge of the empire where imperial authority became uncertain and its territory unclear. The central government had little interest in the region beyond the tax revenues obtained from its sedentary population: few imperial troops were committed to patrol there, and the bedouin could raid and escape back into the desert with little worry of government intervention.

This was all changed with the replacement of the Ottomans by the British and the creation soon afterwards of the Arab Amirate. Transjordan, then, became a political entity in itself and government forces directly interested in controlling the area were now immediately at hand. The central administration took steps to integrate the bedouin into the national structure and gain their support by creating the Bedouin Control Board, which was mandated to handle all complaints and legal problems concerning the bedouin, and by providing for bedouin representation in the new National Assembly. Neither of these
measures proved effective. The Board fell into disuse and was abolished, and the representation yielded the bedouin little influence since they share few, if any, interests with other sections of the population. However, other events were influential in the Khreisha encapsulation, including the creation of international borders and the imposition of transit requirements, the establishment of a standing army with a desert police force, and government reform of the agriculture and land tenure conditions in the country.

The international boundaries were drawn directly athwart the traditional migrational routes of the Beni Sakhr Huwaytāt, and other tribes and hindered the free movement of bedouin between their winter and summer pastures. Part of the hindrance came from the enforcement of new transit requirements, such as border checks, the necessity of clearing crossings officially, and the submission of bedouin livestock to head counts. Additional border-related difficulties for the nomads arose from the efforts of the new Sa'udi and Transjordanian governments to flout each other's sovereignty by alternately wooing and harassing the other's bedouin to get them to change their national affiliation. The bedouin, caught in the middle, became pawns in international politics.

The Jordanian national army, interestingly enough, served as a beneficial force for the bedouin and came to occupy such an important position in their lives, that it is worth spending some moments on it here. Succinctly stated, the military was the medium by which the Khreisha and other bedouin learned to accept the central government and by which also they were encouraged to adopt agriculture and other signs of modernizing change. This was remarkable because, as stated earlier, bedouin such as the Khreisha had a longstanding, one might almost say congenital, suspicion of central governments and a contempt for sedentary people such as peasant agriculturalists; yet by the 1950's the Khreisha had revised their attitudes and values on these points and were themselves settling down, as well as serving in the army conspicuously and with loyalty. It was remarkable not only that the bedouin changed their attitudes and accepted agriculture, education, and the authority of the central government through the agency of the army, but that they had accepted the army as a source of innovation and help in the first place.

A number of factors combined to effect that change of values and practice, including environmental, economic, and political developments. The late 1920's and the decade of the 1930's--in other words the early years of the British Mandate and the Amirate and of the national army--brought a series of droughts to Transjordan which at times were so unremitting as to constitute practically a single longer catastrophe. Animal stock, sheep as well as camels, suffered greatly and herds were severely run down. In his reports on the region for some of those years, the desert administrator conjured up pictures of steppeland strewn with sheep carcasses. Herdmen tried to recover some of their loss of livelihood to mortality and diminished animal quality by selling from their remaining stock. The net effect of that, however, was to reduce animal reserves in the desert in at least two ways simultaneously.

And there was even a third reductive force at work. About this same time the so-called Great Depression of the 1930's struck and demand for animals and prices plummeted, affecting meat markets around the world. On top of the other problems mentioned the bedouin were unable to sell their animals as readily as before and what they did sell fetched much less money.
Together these circumstances helped to promote the army among the bedouin for a very straightforward reason: the nomads turned to it for their survival. In response to the drought and the disastrous economic conditions in the countryside, the government through the army offered grants of cash stipends as well as some food and grain assistance. It also provided jobs on road construction projects for bedouin and others who were without income and suffering. Administrative reports from the period disclose the great economic importance of this occurrence, for entire families were dependent on the salaries that individual members were earning as soldiers. The assistance of the army plus the benefit of a salary along with the certainty of a livelihood all contributed to the slowly evolving attitude of the bedouin that the army was trying to help them.

Also contributing to conversion of bedouin attitudes was an improvement of the effectiveness of the army as a fighting, or kind of warrior, force. The formation of the Amirate created new internal security needs, and the government sought to eliminate bedouin raiding as one step toward meeting those needs. Initially the army's successes were limited to protecting a few villages, while the bedouin continued their marauding and were only irregularly brought to bar for it. In the late 1920's a new unit, the Desert Patrol, was added to the military structure: its purpose was to police only the desert and it was to be manned entirely by bedouin on the belief that they would know best how to deal with the desert population. This force was enormously successful at chasing down raiders, in many cases confiscating their camels, and by the early 1930's raiding had been virtually abolished. The reputation of the military rose rapidly and soon considerable prestige attached to membership of its ranks.

The army influenced the bedouins' attitudes and behavior in other ways as well, by introducing education and establishing schools in the desert and by encouraging the Khreisha and other bedouin to cultivate, or at least rent out, their lands as another source of income. Schools initially were held at police posts or in tents and were moveable, so that they could follow the bedouin on parts of their migrations; later they were housed in fixed structures. In this way a school was periodically held and, in the 1950's, was established at the place where the Khreisha eventually settled. As for agriculture, the Khreisha decision to allow cultivation experimentally in their territory was timely for government purposes and proved to have a considerable impact on the Khreisha relation to their tribal land.

The government early promulgated a policy of land survey and title reform which had the dual purpose of clearing up the confused land tenure system remnant from the Ottoman empire and of taking stock of the new country's agricultural resources. After initiation of the reform effort the land system changed in most settled parts of the country; and the highlights for the Khreisha may be outlined as follows: the Khreisha acceded to the government's wish to survey their tribal territory, and eventually three surveys were conducted over a forty-year period; and Khreisha territory already overseen in trust by the sheikh was registered in his name, and that was followed by progressive subdivision of the land and registration of plots in the names of individual Khreisha, thereby eroding the corporate principle behind their relation to the land; and the Khreisha became landlords, renting out private plots to peasant and Palestinian cultivators for personal income.
The Khreisha, through their sheikh, has irregularly rented out land at two locations during the 1930's and 1940's; and finally, in the 1950's they began to settle at one of these sites near the edge of the temperate zone but well within the desert steppe. Oral as well as documentary evidence suggests that they chose to settle because of a number of factors in combination. The army, for example, made steady incomes available to the bedouin who had previously relied on the comparatively uncertain livelihood of pastoralism; this led to the siphoning off of young men who formerly would have provided herding personnel. Education diverted some of the labor pool too, and when the school was fixed in one place attendance was made easier with sedentarization. Land rental also added to their income and some Khreisha then chose to sell their stock which augmented their livelihood even more. The disposal of the herds eliminated the main reason for the bedouin to move anymore, and with so many other reasons for settling down they began to become sedentary.

The foregoing comments barely sketch out the encapsulation of the Khreisha and trace a few ways they became linked into the structure of the new state entity. We have seen that they have undergone changes in various aspects of their societal organization, their attitudes and values, and economic activities. In this final section I want to consider one further aspect, namely their political organization, and this brings us full circle back to the subject of the establishment of permanent offices of leadership within the tribal structure.

Earlier I noted that the tribe as a segmentary structure is unsuited to the development of such offices. I also mentioned that it was nonetheless possible for leaders to emerge and even for certain lineage groups such as the Khreisha to establish the reputation of sheikly lineages characterized by honorable and esteemed individuals with leadership qualities. This was the essence of the tribal authority structure of the Khreisha when the British moved in to administer Transjordan. Using lessons on indirect rule they learned from in Africa, the British administered local populations by dealing, when possible, through indigenous leaders. The sheikh of the Khreisha at the time was a man of considerable status and reputation, and in matters concerning the desert zone and bedouin administration he was sought out and consulted as were other sheikhs of the Beni Sakhr and of other important tribes. The arrangement continued thus through the period of drought in the 1930's and the subsequent shift from camels to sheep late in that decade and in the 1940's, until the Khreisha began settling down in the 1950's right around the time of that sheik's death.

About that same time two positions known as mukhtārs were instituted with government encouragement within the Khreisha settlement and were filled by members of the lineage. In all likelihood these offices were created not to supplant the tribal sheikhs or to modernize the traditional authority structure by grafting on an alien political construct, but simply to facilitate government communication with the population and administration of them. The mukhtārs acted in a clerical capacity, registering births, marriages, divorces, and other important demographic events and helping Khreisha to obtain government documents when needed; they also served generally as contact points between the bedouin and the central government. Yet, with the filling of these two offices--by a vote no less--the Khreisha had acknowledged the authority of the government in yet another way, as they had done by agreeing to the land survey and enlisting in the Desert Patrol;
also they implicitly accepted the principle of the perduring office which was as alien to their traditional social organization as were participation in the military and individual ownership of tribal land.

These officials served the Khreisha for about twenty years, but eventually their positions became superfluous, and by the late 1970's one of the two no longer even resided in the Khreisha settlement. The other (as of 1979) remains mukhtar pretty much in name only; although he is accorded some recognition on that basis at social gatherings. A major contributor to the decline of these offices was the introduction into the settlement of local representatives of governmental ministry departments and other administrative offices. Over the course of those two decades during which the mukhtars served, the government's administrative needs had increased, requiring more efficient and specialized offices. The registry function of the mukhtars was given to a civil servant from the Interior Ministry's department of civil affairs, while the function of government contact went to another civil servant in the local office of the provincial administrative system to one of the Khreisha who was elected to a municipal position (ra'is al-Baladiyya), somewhat akin to that of a town administrator.

The mukhtars were the first generation of officeholders among the Khreisha and by the 1970's they had already been succeeded by more specialized officials. At the end of that decade, when I was living in this settlement out in the Jordanian desert-steppe, there were still more offices staffed with civil servants, including a police post, a post office, a medical center for general medical care, and another one for obstetric and pediatric care.

With the addition of such offices, indeed with the rise of the state, the role and authority of the sheikh have altered in some respects. He no longer possesses the authority or power to extend his protection to all who come seeking it: whereas once he was ad-dustour (literally, 'the constitution') of the tribe, I was told, he is not so anymore. If, for example, a murderer fled to him for sanctuary against revenge killing by the victim's relatives and the state wanted the fugitive, the sheikh would be obliged to yield to its will in the affair. This is a touchy area because King Hussein has had to rely on bedouin support to stay in power; therefore, it is likely that neither the state nor the bedouin would want such a situation to reach a point of conflict between the government's claims and the sheikh's desire to maintain his position and image as generous and powerful protector.

In a narrower field, the sheikh no longer exercises quite the influence over the use of lands that were once corporate tribal territory. The expectation is that individuals wishing to sell their land will first offer it to other Khreisha and, if there are not takers, will then open it to outside purchasers. In fact, this ideal is not always followed.

One function of the sheikh has been shared among several of the officials who are newly positioned in the settlement. In past ages, the sheikhs were the reference or contact point for outsiders dealing with the tribe or any of its sections. As noted above, this function fell to the mukhtar when that position was created following the establishment of the settlement. And recently government agents have even taken a larger role in the contact function to the extent that they have moved with their offices into the settlement.
Nevertheless, the sheikh has retained traditional rights and authority; he can call together a sitting of the lineage men, and he is still visited in his tent by people seeking his intercession in some problem or other form of help. It is true that the town administrator (ra'i's al-baladiyya) may also be visited in his office, and he does now have managerial responsibilities, that is, those concerning the oversight of the settlement and of the conduct of its occupants and the lobbying for government services. However, the sheikh, who spends most of his time visiting tribal leaders and other influential people inside and outside of Jordan, retained the role of spokesman for the lineage, and he still bears the responsibility of protecting those enjoying his hospitality and of maintaining the lineage integrity. In other words, what might be regarded as core obligations of the traditional role have been maintained, while its power mainly has been reduced or circumscribed; and government structures have been grafted alongside it onto the traditional structure.

The Khreisha have undergone a myriad of changes besides those discussed here, but these examples illustrate the breadth and depth of change as well as certain continuities in Khreisha society. The creation of the Amirate and its later evolution into the Kingdom in 1948 posed obstacles for the Khreisha and other bedouin, restricting their customary nomadic pastoral pattern of activity; and the effect of those political developments was heightened by other forces such as the drought and the depression. However, the changes following in the wake of the formation of the state and the encapsulation of the bedouin also created new opportunities, such as the army. At one time, the Khreisha regarded with suspicion all dealings with a central government and rejected its offers of assistance; now they accept the rule of the king and the authority of the government and readily enlist in the national army. The military is a frequently sought career among bedouin men, who are well represented and highly visible at both the officer and enlisted levels (a fact for which King Hussein must be everlastingly thankful since they have kept him in power in the face of several attempted coups d'etat since the 1950's). And the Khreisha have altered their attitudes toward and uses of their traditional territory. No longer held corporately by the tribal section and overseen in trust by the sheikh, it is used for personal ends.

In view of these changes and the circumscription of the sheikh's authority one might be led to ask whether or not the bedouin are likely to remain distinct, retaining at least vestiges of their former organization. Or will they adopt so many practices and institutions from the government and the urban-based society as to lose all signs of their identity and become absorbed into the state structure? This, of course, is the very result envisaged by Bailey in his third type of encapsulation. One treads on uncertain ground when making predictions, so I would prefer instead to close with an emphasis of a few points.

It is still early days and thus difficult to tell what has happened for certain. While many Khreisha have settled and adopted urban patterns such as salaried jobs, civil service and otherwise, some have not, and the tribal structure has not been fundamentally altered. Nor are there any signs that the manner of selecting the sheikh has been either; more than likely his successor will emerge from his own line or from that of his father, i.e. from among his brothers. Perduring government offices which exist apart from their occupants have been juxtaposed with the tribal structure, the two are functioning side by side, by the principle of
permanency inherent in the former has not begun filling traditional tribal roles. Whether or not, after further bedouin experience of encapsulation and the state organization, that principle will be adopted and other changes obliterating the tribal nomadic past are instituted as well, time will disclose.

NOTES

1. This paper was presented in abridged form in the symposium 'Responses of Indigenous/Local Systems of Authority to Imported Patterns of State Power,' XIth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Phase I (Quebec City, Quebec, Canada), August 14-17, 1983. This and the other symposium papers are being revised by their authors in accordance with issues and questions raised in discussion during the session, and it is expected that they will be published together in a journal at a later date.

The discussion here is sketchy in parts and is to be regarded as still preliminary in many respects. A fuller, but earlier, treatment of the developments and theoretical applications considered here can be found in (Hiatt 1981).

2. The impact of the army was strongly felt also because of the efforts of one particular man, John B. Glubb, and Abu Jaber and Gharaiheb (1981) are generally correct in their appraisal of his role. Glubb was a captain with the British army in Iraq where he served as the agent of the Mandate administration among the bedouin. Because of his familiarity with their language, customs, and oral law tradition he was reassigned to Jordan in 1930 and became desert administrator with policing power and virtually a free hand in the task of controlling the bedouin tribes there. He certainly was sympathetic toward the bedouin, preferring to spend his time in the desert among them to office routine, and he tried to buffer the onslaught of change upon them. But he did more than that in numerous aspects of bedouin life, including introducing education, encouraging the allowance of cultivation on tribal lands, and inducing bedouin to accept military service. These accomplishments are dealt with in a general way in this paper; and see my discussion based on British Mandate and other unpublished materials for a fuller treatment (Hiatt 1981).

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Kaziha, Walid
Peters, Emrys L.

Sweet, Louise

Joseph M. Hiatt
2144 California Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
U.S.A.