"Pastoralism and the state in Africa: Marginality or incorporation?"

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The study of pastoral societies has long been the domain of ethnographic study which has stressed the inner life of such groups as though they were a world unto themselves. Scholars, no doubt attracted by what seemed to be different and exotic in Western eyes, the last specimens of vanishing cultures, centered their attention on the inner workings of given pastoralist societies. When external factors were discussed, the focus was mainly on ecological and economic constraints that determined adaptive strategies, usually at individual household and community levels. Less attention was paid to external factors of a historical or political nature, whose effect was felt at a larger, whole-societal scale and over longer periods of time. When comparisons of different pastoralist groups were drawn, they were more of a static, classificatory nature, frozen in time at a certain ‘anthropological present’ rather than the outcome of a historical flow of change following the broader socio-political fortunes of such groups and of the regions where they lived and interacted with other people.

Recently, however, the tide seems to have changed. More comparative and historically focused studies of nomadic pastoralism have started to appear. Khazanov’s work on Central Asia (1984) is one such example. In another example Salzmann has drawn our attention to the influence of incorporation in larger states on the emergence of greater inequality and stronger local political authority among pastoralist groups (Salzman 1979: 429-46). On Africa, Frantz compared the fortunes of various pastoralist groups across political boundaries in order to show the effect, not only of differential ecological and economic conditions, but also of political regimes (Frantz 1978, 1981). More recently, edited volumes by Galaty and Bonte (1991) and Fratkin et al. (1994) have also drawn attention to political and historical factors in the study of contemporary pastoralist peoples. Furthermore, they stressed not only external factors acting upon pastoralists but also internal factors which have shown the pastoralists to be more active players in the historical scene. As Bonte and Galaty put it in the introduction to their volume: “African pastoralists have been and remain both subject to larger forces of influence and agents of their own histories, shapers of their own futures” (1991: 5). My own work on the comparative political fortunes of the Fulbe in Guinea, Nigeria and Cameroon (1978) and recently on their settlement patterns related to state-formation (1993) has stressed a more comparative and macro-historical approach based on both internal and external factors. Recent interest in the effects of civil wars has, no doubt, sensitized us further to the impact of political factors and macro-societal adjustment. The early tendency to concentrate on the inner life of ‘chosen’ groups, somewhat detached from the external world, has given way to a more distant ‘bird’s eye’ view in an attempt to dis-
cover, in admittedly rough brushstrokes, some more general patterns of change and development.

My own 'chosen' people, the Fulbe, have indeed been an ideal subject for comparative-historical study as they spread throughout West and Central Africa and, in the 18th and 19th centuries, played a central role in one of the most important religious and political upheavals to affect the region prior to the colonial period. Fulbe clerics, led by their Torodhe branch, played a prominent role in a series of Jihads (religious wars) which, when successful, led to the formation of Islamic states. Large groups of Fulbe pastoralists rallied these movements, offered crucial military support and spread them to a wide area, including to regions which were not yet touched by a strong Islamic presence. The very dispersal of the Fulbe, due to their migration, and the ties that they maintained among themselves, contributed to the success of the Jihads and to their wide geographic spread.

Most Fulbe took an active part in the Jihads and were incorporated, at privileged positions, in larger, more centralized political units than they had experienced before (Rodney 1968: 270; Azarya 1979: 157-90; M. G. Smith 1960: 299-305). By contrast, smaller groups of Fulbe who took little part in the Jihad and state-formation, or even actually opposed them, continued to live at the margin, or completely beyond those states, in smaller, decentralized units, as in the past. These groups of marginalized Fulbe came to be called M'bororo in most areas and their differentiation from the rest of their kinsmen grew steadily.

State formation in the 18th and 19th centuries not only differentiated the Fulbe among themselves, but also distinguished them from other pastoralists who did not develop large-scale states such as the Maasai, the Samburu, the Rendille, the Turkana, the Herero, etc. Such groups kept their distance from existing states. They were not incorporated in large-scale centralized political structures. On the contrary, they usually resisted or moved away when pressure was exerted on them to be incorporated in a larger central authority. Even when they developed superior military skills, they preferred to raid other groups or to push them away from contested land rather than rule them. Their political organization remained fragmented into relatively small and mobile units. By contrast, the Fulbe showed greater resemblance to other pastoralist groups, such as the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, who established much stronger pre-colonial states than hitherto existed in their region and formed a ruling upper class over subdued agriculturalist people.

Anchoring ourselves on the Fulbe case, with comparative reference to the Tutsi on the one hand, and to the Maasai, Samburu, Turkana as well as to the M'bororo branch of the Fulbe on the other, we can thus refer to a major division between the state-forming or state-incorporated type of pastoralists and the segmentary-marginal type. It is the contention of this article that this major division (which obviously includes various mixed types as in all ideal-typical categorization), had important consequences on the economy, stratification and settlement patterns of the groups involved. It is further suggested that this division may help understand some of the differences in responses to colonial and post-colonial changes and that the patterns of incorporation or marginalization detected since colonialism and independence accentuated the different tendencies which already existed in the pre-colonial period.
Stratification

To keep this article at a reasonable length, I will not discuss here the historical background and the political structure of the various pastoralist groups of either the state-forming or segmentary stateless type. The topic is well covered in individual studies of the different groups. A systematic comparison of these groups’ polities might be useful but cannot be undertaken within the scope of this article. I will, therefore, proceed directly into the effects of state-formation and look into distinctions between the two types of pastoralists in other aspects of their society. An important such differentiation emerges with regard to stratification.

State formation by pastoralists not only brought the latter into a dominant position but also created greater stratification in the entire society, accentuating the difference from the more egalitarian structure of most other pastoralist groups. In the Fulbe case, the families who led the Jihad became a ruling aristocracy controlling land and servile labour. The closer one’s ties to the ruling families, the greater share one had in these major spoils of success. Positions held in the state bureaucracy carried rewards specifically attached to the given office and greater bureaucratization meant greater and more hierarchical differentiation between office holders. Furthermore, ethnic and religious identity were used as general markers of status in society. Fulbe, as a whole, reached superior positions over non-Fulbe and Muslims over non-Muslims. A sense of noblesse (ndimu) played an important role in distinguishing between different groups of society. Islam became an important source of ndimu, in addition to traditional values associated with pastoralism. Slavery expanded very much and important differences in rights and privileges existed between household slaves, public slaves, former slaves, second-generation slaves, etc. Various sectors of free people were also hierarchically ordered by occupation, ethnicity and religion and were recognized as separate strata. A much more stratified society thus emerged in which various identity profiles were converted into inherited differential wealth, power and prestige (Azarya 1978: 15-47; Marty 1921: 442-45; Dupire 1970: 428-29; M. G. Smith 1955: 116).

The Fulbe experience was similar to that of the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi who also ruled over strongly stratified societies following state-formation (D’Hertefelt 1966: 410-11, 421-27; Lernachand 1966: 404). Stratification in Rwanda was based on a system of clientage according to which the cattle owning Tutsi offered their Hutu clients support and protection and gave them some cattle to tend and maintain usufruct rights on. In return, the Hutu put their labour at their patron’s disposal; they cultivated their patron’s land, offered them agricultural products and performed all kinds of menial work for them (D’Hertefelt 1962: 34-35, 67-68; Maquet 1960: 313-14; Trouwborst 1962: 130). Some of them became, in effect, household servants of their Tutsi patrons while others established their households on land allocated to them by their patrons. The Twas, a much smaller group who were considered of lowest status, remained beyond the regular clientage system and were directly subservient to the king. They maintained hunting rights in return for menial services offered to the state. They were also engaged in pottery, some were recruited as royal guards and some performed as singers, dancers, buffoons and executioners in the royal court (D’Hertefelt 1962: 68).

The clientage structure was extended to the Tutsi’s own relationship with their political superiors, the military and ad-
ministrative chiefs, who were, in turn, clients of the king (D’Hertefelt 1962: 69; De Heusch 1966: 137). Chiefs of land and cattle ensured the collection of agricultural and pastoral products from the Hutu and the Tutsi respectively. The Tutsi controlled the military and were the only ones allowed to bear arms; the Hutu were apparently recruited only as porters and non-combat personnel. Land which in principle was state’s property, was allocated by the king to his chiefs and officials who, in turn, distributed it to their subjects and clients (D’Hertefelt 1962: 36-37; Louis 1963: 110-11). In contrast to the Fulbe example, slavery was not common in Rwanda and Burundi (Trouwborst 1962: 140; Bourgeois 1957: 166; D’Hertefelt 1962: 59) but the system of clientage fulfilled the same function of securing labour, land and their products to those who ruled the state and established themselves as the upper class.

In Burundi, stratification was a bit more complex than in Rwanda as the Tutsi, themselves, were differentiated into a higher class coming from the north (Banyaruguru) and a more southern lower class (Bahima). Moreover, the royal lineage of Ganwa was distinguished from both the Tutsi and the Hutu and existed as a virtually separate group. Princes of the Ganwa lineage often competed with each other. While the Tutsi domination of the Hutu was not in doubt, the clientage system in force was less strict than the one in Rwanda (Trouwborst 1962: 120, 143-53; Lemarchand 1966: 402-06; D’Hertefelt 1966: 421-26; Albert 1966: 54-55).

The pastoralist groups who were not involved in state-formation were also generally less stratified (with some notable exceptions to be mentioned below). They were more based on segmentary lineage or age-group systems than on inherited status distinctions which derived from political and economic differences. Inequality could still exist in such societies but was less likely to be inherited as born privilege (or underprivilege) except for a few specialized occupations, such as that of medicine men and of blacksmiths. When age-groups played a major role in the society, as among the Maasai, the Nandi, the Karamojong, etc., differential privileges depended above all on one’s age-grade. As each group moved through the ages it also gradually moved to positions of higher status and authority which most members of that group had a chance to share. Except for gender which was a constant source of inequality and the special positions occupied by a few occupational specialists, rights and privileges were transmitted from one generation to another as new generations came of age, thus preventing the crystallization of class differences (see Dahl 1979: 274-79; Jacobs 1975: 414-16; Gulliver 1975: 373; Dyson-Hudson 1966: 179).

Stratification was not always related to state-formation. The Fulbe’s northern neighbours, the Tuareg and the Tubu, for example, formed highly stratified societies without reaching the same centralization and formalization of political authority found in the Fulbe (Keenan 1972: 345-51; Bernus 1966: 12-14; Bernus 1975: 233-36; Bourgeot 1975: 266-76; Chapelle 1957: 7). Stratification could, indeed, exist without state-formation. The opposite, however, was hardly possible: State-formation did not exist without a stratified society and was, indeed, a prime mover into increased stratification and hierarchy in pastoralist-ruled societies.

Sedentarization

State formation and attainment of upper class positions in a more stratified society were also connected with accelerat-
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existence in such a manner so that the immediate privileges of the pastoralists are taken away from them, or when they are pushed into regions not suitable to animal husbandry, sedentarization may take large-scale dimensions (on periodic droughts in West African history see Swift 1972: 470-71). By contrast, just as droughts, diseases, political defeats generalized the settlement caused by poverty beyond individual households, state formation generalized settlement out of increased wealth, spread it to a wider region or group and attributed the source of wealth more clearly to political dominance. Those pastoralists who reached dominant positions in the newly created states gained control over land and manpower (slaves, serfs, subjected people). Freed of manual economic labour, they settled permanently and consecrated themselves to religious learning, teaching, juridical, administrative, political and military activities which enhanced their newly acquired noble status.

Examples of wide-scale sedentarization that followed state formation abound among the Fulbe in the 18th and 19th centuries. As the Fulbe became a ruling class throughout West Africa many pastoralists settled down and were given appointments in the various governments (Adamu 1986: 59; Azarya 1978: 25-38). In Zaria, after his victory, Mallam Musa, the flagbearer of Othman dan Fodio, allotted land to the Fulbe kin groups who had helped him. On those lands were built the Runde slave villages of the families concerned (M. G. Smith 1955: 81-82). Similarly, Marty (1921: 154-57) and Vieillard (1940: 180-81) reported on the ruling Fulbe of Futa Jallon who permanently settled; their cattle were herded by hired or dependent poorer Fulbe and agriculture was undertaken by their slaves. In Massina sedentarization was forced on the Fulbe by Shehu Ahmadu and an elaborate scheme of state-organized seasonal cattle move-
ment and division of agricultural and pasture land was devised. The pastoralists who did not accept these policies had to move away to the territorial fringes of the state and beyond (Gallais 1967: 91-92; Riesman 1984: 185; De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1993: 128-31; Cissé 1986: 288). Among the Fulbe, the commoners (called Jallobe) were distinguished from their higher class kinsmen (the Weheebe) who formed the ruling political and religious élite. Only the latter based their economy on large land holdings and entire slave villages (De Bruijn 1992: 3-8). In Futa Toro, “opponents of the regime lost their lands and these territories were given by the Almamy to his victorious warriors and marabouts. In this way the Denianke aristocracy was supplanted by the new aristocracy of the Torobe who even today constitute the “landed gentry” owning the larger part of the valley lands” (Suret-Canale 1971: 429).

It should be added, however, that Fulbe permanent settlement did not always follow state-formation. In some cases, such as Massina and Sokoto, it also preceded it. Most of the Fulbe leaders of the Jihad came from that segment of the population who had already settled in or near centres of Islamic learning. Islamization had indeed caused some permanent settlement of the Fulbe prior to the Jihad, but the successful outcome of the Jihad movements accelerated the process and spread it to a much wider area.

Sedentarization connected with state-formation and restratification was found also in other pastoralist groups in Africa. The Tutsi who formed the upper class in Rwanda and Burundi stopped their nomadic movement after they came to ruling positions. They settled permanently and lived off the work of the subjected agriculturalist Hutu and the hunter-gatherer Twa. The Tutsi regulated the Hutu’s access to pastures and to agricultural land and, while living off Hutu services, maintained the symbolic superiority of owning cattle (D’Hertefelt 1966: 406-33; Maquet 1960: 314-35; Botte 1979: 403-13).

The relationship between state formation and settlement is further supported by the fact that, in Rwanda, Tutsi settlement was more advanced in the central provinces where the state structures and clientage system were more firmly established. In the peripheral northern and northwestern provinces where autonomous Hutu chiefdoms still existed and Tutsi dominance was more recent, the local Tutsi still continued a greater extent of semi-nomadic pastoralism reminiscent of the pre-state period (Vansina 1962: 79; Bourgeois 1957: 320). It is interesting to note, also, that when Tutsi herdsmen migrated to areas outside the control of Tutsi-dominated kingdoms, such as the Nyamwezi region in today’s Tanzania, their way of life and relationship with the local population resembled very much that of the Mbororo Fulbe in their respective regions. They were organized in small, mobile groups and were stationed outside main settlement areas. They engaged in hardly any cultivation, were known to be notorious cattle thieves and were the least integrated elements of the region. They did not mix with the local population and remained marginal to the local social and political structures (Abrahams 1967: 14).

The pastoralist groups who, by contrast, kept their distance from state-formation and remained less stratified were also more likely to remain nomadic, and when they did undergo permanent settlement, it was mostly out of necessity rather than out of choice, a result of excessive poverty due to loss of livestock (Bernsten 1976: 3) rather than greater wealth and expanding opportunities. In Southern Africa, the Herero engaged in ‘migratory drift’ in which a pastoral or-
bit gradually shifts over time and leads to migration. Their camps were small, temporary and lightly built. They strongly disliked agriculture but did undertake some hunting as a secondary economic activity for both subsistence and trade (Vivelo 1977: 70-71, 94-96). In East Africa, the Maasai were singularly reticent to permanent settlement and to non-pastoralist occupations (Jacobs 1975: 414-16; Talbot 1972: 702). So were their Samburu kinsmen in the north who lived mostly off the products of their cattle and moved them in irregular patterns in search of water and pastures. The Samburu’s nomadic pattern was affected by the size of their herds and the manpower at their disposal, but the tendency was towards dispersal in small and mobile groups (Spencer 1965: 2-7, 297). The Rendille whose economy was based on camel moved in larger groups (Spencer 1965: 297). Among other pastoralist groups of the region, the Karamojong, the Pokot and the Nandi were relatively more sedentary as they combined cultivation with pastoralism. They had a permanent residential basis occupied continuously or seasonally by some family members while others followed herd movements (Gulliver & Gulliver 1953: 33, 50; Gulliver 1975: 370; Dyson-Hudson 1966: 34-38, 55-74). The Turkana, by contrast, had no permanent household and were particularly mobile as they moved in relatively small groups and were not bound by larger corporate decisions (Gulliver 1975: 374; Gulliver & Gulliver 1953: 63-67). All these groups displayed a pastoral ideology as cattle were the most highly valued possession, object of praise, songs, intense attention, great emotional expression and, in some cases, media of contact with deities (Dyson-Hudson 1966: 94-96, 101-02; Arhem 1983a: 10; Langley 1979: 112).

The literature on pastoral societies shows a special propensity of nomadic groups toward more egalitarian structures and limited development of political authority (Frons 1979: 361; Schneider 1982: 27; Dahl 1979: 274-79; Burnham 1979: 351). It is, indeed, possible that the economic and ecological requirements of nomadic pastoralism are more conducive to smaller, more dispersed and more autonomous social units and inhibit the development of political centralization and inherited stratification. One may also argue, however, that nomadism is not only a response to ecological and economic needs and a cause of political dispersion but also a result of political development, an indication of marginality vis-à-vis new states and the deep social changes that they engender. When surplus from the pastoral economy could be transferred to trade and land ownership, inequality could rise and become more permanent. Such opportunities were created with state-formation but the nomadic groups in question did not take advantage of them, or were not allowed to, and remained in a marginal political position.

In the late 19th and early 20th century pastoralists were devastated by the rinderpest epidemics which swept through most of Africa as well as by drought, famine and smallpox epidemics. These were vividly referred to as disasters which led to large-scale sedentarization due to loss of pastoralist livelihood (De Saint-Croix 1945: 12-13; Baxter 1975: 221; Spencer 1965: xxvii-xxviii; Gulliver & Gulliver 1953: 29). Some of these groups did remain sedentary agriculturalists but many were able to rebuild their herds and returned to nomadic pastoralism (Talbot 1972: 701; Galaty 1982a: 8; Bernsten 1976: 3; Vivelo 1977: 2-8, 16). Unlike state-forming pastoralists, expanded opportunity meant for them a chance to return to their traditional mobile economy.
Colonial changes

The transformations and differentiation detected among African pastoralist groups prior to the colonial period continued in the same direction after the establishment of European rule. Indeed, one is struck by the extent of continuity displayed in a period which was supposed to have caused fundamental changes in African societies. Trends that started earlier were maintained and even strengthened; the processes of incorporation versus marginality, and their concomitant ties to stratification and settlement, continued under colonial rule and drove the two types of pastoralist groups further apart.

Pastoralist groups who formed pre-colonial states and came to ruling positions also became the principal collaborators of the colonial government even though the establishment of the colonial rule meant loss of sovereignty as independent state. In most cases, after a brief resistance to the colonial incursion, the ruling pastoralists sensed the futility of further opposition, due to the great gap in military technology, and came to an accommodation with the colonial powers that would leave their privileged position in society more or less intact. The colonial administration which needed local agents and mediators who would ensure the maintenance of law and order, the effective collection of taxes and the recruitment of manpower for public works, was quite content to rely on those groups who appeared to command the greatest authority in their region.

The pre-colonial ruling pastoralists were thus incorporated into the colonial power structure. Obviously, some paramount rulers lost their supreme authority and saw their territory fragmented; some individual rulers were indeed replaced (usually by kinsmen with similar claims to authority). However, by and large, the ruler-subject relationship was not altered. In certain cases, the range of the pre-colonial authority even expanded when colonial administrators, lacking an intimate knowledge of local conditions or in pursuit of larger, more functional units that facilitated government, extended traditional rulers’ authority to populations who had not been subjected to them before.

One of the major pillars of traditional dominance, the institution of slavery, was, indeed, abolished by the colonial powers, but without a parallel change in land tenure. Thus, the liberated slaves and their descendants were simply transformed into economically dependent sharecroppers still cultivating their former masters’ land or offering them other services (Azarya 1978: 33-38; De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1993: 134). Former rulers were the primary beneficiaries of the economic innovations brought to the area, such as new cash-crops, higher productivity due to technological improvement, expanding commercial opportunities, etc. Permanent settlement accelerated and, for these groups, continued to be motivated by a sense of expanding opportunities. Colonial change did not significantly alter pre-colonial patterns of stratification. As for the cultural bases of the traditional order, they were touched even less by the colonial presence, especially where Islam reigned supreme.

The Fulbe are prime examples of such incorporation in the colonial structure that kept their pre-colonial superiority virtually intact. Their military clashes with colonial forces were usually short-lived; they soon cut their losses and shifted to collaboration with the colonialists. An exception to that was El Hajj Omar’s son Ahmadu who waged a long losing battle against advancing French forces, but another son, Agibu,
was willing to collaborate with the French and replaced his brother after the latter fled to Sokoto. On the whole, pre-colonial ruling families managed to maintain the socio-political order that ensured their superiority (Azarya 1978: 65-68; Lacroix 1952: 37-38, 55-57).

The Fulbe ruling class benefitted from the economic changes introduced into their region, though they also incurred losses from the near collapse of the trans-Saharan trade. They were willing participants in the growing commercialization of cattle. As largest landholders, they also earned the greatest share of the revenue generated by the development of cash crops. Land ownership did not change while the economic value of land rapidly increased (Azarya 1978: 79-84).

As M. G. Smith put it: "Aristocrats asserted their rights to the land formerly attached to their rumada (slave villages). Ex-slaves working such land remained under the authority of its owner (iyajen gijil) and were indebted to him for rent which they paid in kind" (1960: 223; see also Vieillard 1940: 154-55; Forde 1946: 120-21, 169). Moreover, as Fulbe overwhelmingly controlled local native authority positions, they had administrative control over land allocation and could send recalcitrant subjects to forced labour in public works (Vieillard 1940: 155; Campbell 1963: 154-58). The economic and political bases of traditional stratification thus continued unabated under colonial rule.

A similar incorporation in the colonial government and continuation of the ruler-subject relationship can be seen also in Rwanda and Burundi (Lemarchand 1973: 433; D’Hertefelt 1966: 435-36). The indirect rule that relied on the pre-colonial elite clearly favoured the Tutsi over the Hutu. Colonial authorities were convinced that they had to rely on the Tutsi, whom they considered intellectually su-

perior and politically more experienced, in order to maintain a stable colonial rule (De Heusch 1966: 442). In the words of the German Acting Governor of Ruanda-Urundi in January 1906: “I am as convinced as ever that it would be mistaken to try now to break up the great and well established sultanates for the purpose of imposing German government...The present tightly organized political structure of the sultanates offers a favorable opportunity to administer and develop culturally the natives through their traditional rulers with the least expense concerning paid administrators and least recourse to European force” (Louis 1963: 129). It is interesting to note here the use of the term ‘sultanate’ by which the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were called, associating them with Islamic kingdoms with which Europeans were more familiar, and in the African context including, no doubt, the Fulbe kingdoms.

In Burundi, colonial rule caused a degree of consolidation and centralization of the relatively decentralized structures of the kingdom (Luwel 1962: 238). In Rwanda, German and Belgian expeditions were instrumental in ensuring the inclusion of northern provinces in the kingdom (D’Hertefelt 1966: 421; Louis 1963: 153). The Tutsi were kept in charge of local government, and sometimes even replaced Hutsi chiefs (Lemarchand 1973: 423, 433). The Tutsi also heavily outweighed the Hutu in Western education and occupations, thus increasing the gap between the two groups in economic opportunities. The strong Tutsi representation among Western educated groups contrasts with the pastoralist groups’ general reluctance to accept Western education compared to other groups in their respective colonial territories. This was certainly true among segmentary pastoralists, but also among the Fulbe.
because of their Islamic resistance to Christian influence in Western schools. The Tutsi, however, quickly grasped the opportunities offered to them by Western education.

The clientage system did come under some strain during the colonial period as new opportunities offered by European enterprises competed with the labour owed to one's patron as part of clientage obligations. Nonetheless, the clientage system remained in force for most of the colonial period; it started to be gradually dismantled only in the 1950s, as the Hutu majority started to become politically more active. The traditional land tenure system (especially the critical right to pasture) was maintained even longer and, for a while, despite the weakening of clientage, the Hutu remained economically subservient to the Tutsi. As landowners, the Tutsi were beneficiaries of the increased commercial value of the crops. Hutu freed of their clientage obligations to their Tutsi patrons still had difficulty finding grazing land for their cattle while Tutsi cattle owners still had the right to have their cattle graze in Hutu cultivated land. Such right was abolished only in 1960, shortly before independence (D'Hertefelt 1962: 228-30; D'Hertefelt 1966: 435). Thus, for virtually the entire colonial period, the pre-colonial power relations and stratification remained unchanged.

In contrast with the incorporation of state-forming pastoralists in the colonial system, the encounter of 'stateless' pastoralist groups with European colonialism led, in most cases, to their further marginalization. Here too pre-colonial trends continued in the same direction under the new conditions. These pastoralists, with some notable exceptions, took little part in colonial innovations and did not establish themselves as intermediaries between colonial authorities and the native population. On the contrary, they were considered by the colonial authorities to be the most intractable of the native populations, those who had to be contained rather than relied on in the new order. The more centralized and fragmented their political system, the more difficult it was for the colonial power to establish a 'native administration' of chiefs who would command the respect and obedience of the population. The way of life of these groups was seen as economically wasteful and they were not expected to show interest in change. Some of them were considered violent and all of them were considered difficult to control as long as they continued to pursue their nomadic life. They were pushed away from their grazing areas, some of which reverted to agriculture, to mixed farming and to new settlement of both Africans and Europeans. They were either relocated in closed reserves or had to move away to more arid and less accessible areas, unless they already lived in the desert or in its fringes.

The initial reaction of 'stateless' pastoralist groups varied. Some, like the Nandi, the Turkana and the Herero strongly opposed it. For others, like the Samburu and the Pokot, it came as a welcome protection at a time when they were under increased pressure from other groups such as the Boran, the Turkana or the Karamojong. The Samburu, for example, joined British expeditions against Turkana and used that opportunity to regain some lost cattle and land. They quickly rebuilt their herds and gained the upper hand compared to the Turkana, the Boran and the Rendille (Spencer 1965: xviii; Spencer 1973: 158-59). However, by and large, even the more welcoming groups were not spared the general marginalization effect that colonial policies caused on segmentary nomadic pastoralists.
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loss of income, these were more than ever the result of colonial policies. It was for a ‘native’ to become a helmsman of the ship of state, to show them what they were as long as they were nomad. In this context, the option of moving to new land was given to the Herero. The Bushmen were traditionally herders, but the Herero were also pastoralists. The Herero were used to nomadic life, whereas the Bushmen were more settled, with their own land and way of life.

The Maasai provide a good illustration of such marginalization. Having been too weakened by rinderpest, smallpox, and internal warfare, they could not mount any effective resistance to colonial conquests but were still considered violent and dangerous. Under colonial rule, they lost most of their traditional grazing land and were severely restricted in their freedom of movement. In 1904 and 1911, they were moved into ‘native reserves’ in Southern Kenya; the land that they vacated was opened to European settlement and later also to the establishment of game parks and to African agricultural colonization (Jacobs 1975: 412-13; James 1939: 53-57; Huntingford 1953b: 103; Arhem 1985b: 19-22). Their Samburu kinsmen were established in similar reserves in the north and a large part of their territory became a northern wildlife refuge area (Fumagalli 1978: 51). In Tanganyika, too, large portions of land were taken away from them for agriculture and especially for wildlife conservation. Since the 1930s the Serengeti and Ngorongoro areas were declared wildlife conservation areas and the movement of domestic animals in them was subjected to numerous restrictions. The establishment of the Serengeti National Park in 1959 forced the Maasai to leave that area altogether and move to Ngorongoro (Arhem 1985b: 29-33). By contrast, no colonial authority ever thought of putting the Fulbe or the Tutsi in reserves. They were not seen as people to be pushed to the margin of society; on the contrary, it was deemed imperative that they be incorporated and made allied intermediaries for the new system to succeed.

Even in the ‘native reserves’ the Maasai faced restrictions. Their cattle were put on quarantine and their movement and sale beyond the reserves was prohibited, ostensibly to prevent the spread of diseases to the European settlers. This, in effect, eliminated any prospects of Maasai commercial pastoralism and ensured high prices for European owned cattle (Jacobs 1975: 413; Sindiga 1984: 28, 36; James 1939: 56-71). Confinement in reserves also meant being cut off from dry season grazing areas. The Maasai had to graze their cattle all year round in areas which in the past served them only as wet season pastures (Arhem 1985b: 19, 22). The decline in grazing conditions led pastoralists to fight each other for water and better pastures, which reinforced colonial views of their intractable and violent nature. The problem of overgrazing was, however, paradoxically mitigated by recurrent droughts and diseases which, periodically, wiped out large numbers of stock (James 1939: 54-57; Spencer 1973: 189). In the 1920s more than 30 percent of the Maasai cattle were lost to drought. In 1959-61, the Samburu lost 1/3 of their cattle to drought while the losses of the Kajiado Maasai amounted to 65 percent of their stock (Fumagalli 1978: 53; Sindiga 1984: 29).

The colonial attitude that the Maasai had to be contained rather than be relied on was also reflected in the compulsory abolition of the separate warrior settlements, in order to reduce the autonomous power of the warrior age-group. Even the attempt to recruit some Maasai to the colonial army was short-lived and Maasai units were dismissed for unsuitability in 1902 (James 1939: 66-67). The Maasai, more than any other group, corresponded to the European view of ‘noble savage’, tall, elegant, walking with a gentle spring of the heel, proud and indifferent to all but the most necessary external influences (Ole Kantai 1971: vii). For the Europeans, they were a showcase of the ‘different’ and as such objects of curiosity but also naturally placed at the margin of society.
It should be noted, however, that colonial authorities had much greater success in introducing their policies among some other pastoralist groups such as the Nandi. Even though the Nandi mounted a strong resistance to the British rule, with uprisings occurring as late as 1923, and were also put on native reserves, once they realized the futility of resistance they showed much greater acceptance of colonial induced changes. They sedentarized in great numbers and made remarkable progress in agricultural production (Allan 1965: 289; Huntingford 1953a: 4; Langley 1979: 5-7, 126). The Kalenjin speaking group, with the possible exception of the Pokot, showed, in general, greater willingness to adapt their economy to colonial changes and policies. They formed a remarkable exception to the general trend of further marginalization that befell on segmentary nomadic pastoralists under colonial rule.

Looking at some other groups, the Rendille displayed considerable opposition to colonial attempts to introduce changes in their society and had little respect for their colonial-appointed chiefs. A harmony of sorts was reached between them and the British only after both sides adopted a policy of mutual disinterest in each other (Spencer 1973: 166-171). Large-scale military expeditions were carried out also against the Turkana in the 1910s and 1920s. They were finally subjugated in 1926 but even in the 1950s colonial presence was hardly felt in their territory (Gulliver & Gulliver 1953: 12, 54, 85). Colonial rule stopped the Turkana in the midst of a great southward drive. However, with economic hardship mounting in their region, some Turkana families continued to move southward in search for wage labour opportunities. They established separate communities in Samburu inhabited areas and some of them adopted the Samburu language and culture (Hjort 1982: 55-59). The incorporation of this group in the colonial economy was, however, a collective loss for the Turkana since the group in question lost its Turkana identity.

The difference between the colonial incorporation of pre-colonial state-forming pastoralists and the marginalization of the ‘stateless’ types can be observed also when we compare the Fulbe and the Mbororo. While the sedentary Fulbe were incorporated into the colonial system and benefitted from it considerably, the nomadic M’bororo found themselves at a basic disadvantage, facing scarcer pastures and restricted movement as agricultural zones expanded rapidly. Observers were surprised by the passivity with which Fulbe nomads along the Niger river and in Senegal responded to these developments, viewing them as if they were natural disasters against which little could be done (Gallais 1972: 363-64). It should be noted that some new opportunities also presented themselves with the opening of northern, Tuareg held areas which were previously closed to them. However such northward movement, made possible by the ‘colonial peace’, meant, in effect, a further movement to the periphery, away from the political and economic centres of the south.

The distinction between the Fulbe and the M’bororo widened in the colonial period. In Northern Cameroon, those M’bororo who settled permanently were considered to have ‘become Fulbe’ as if the two belonged to two different ethnic groups. Those continuing their nomadic pastoralism were scorned by the settled Fulbe for their uncivilized manners and their Islamic ignorance (Schultz 1980: 145-46; Salamone 1975: 421). As sedentarization spread rapidly, the number of M’bororo declined and the few who stuck to the nomadic way of life were pushed even more to the margin of
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society (Forget 1963: 57; Forde 1946: 200). In Futa Jallon, permanent settlement of Fulbe was virtually completed. As to the few nomadic Fulbe left in Massina, Vincent reported that the settled Fulbe regarded them as semi-savages and barely tolerated them (1963: 142).

An exception to that trend was observed in the southward movement of the Mbororo into the Meiganga and Bamenda areas in today’s Cameroon, to the Jos plateau in Nigeria and to the Mambila plateau across the Nigeria-Cameroon border. While these areas were at the margin of old pastoral zones and could have been seen as frontier areas by pastoralists, they were not peripheral in the colonial context; on the contrary, they were closer to the colonial centre in the south, and, at least in the case of Jos, were regions of rapid development. In all these areas, the entry of pastoralists led to clashes with cultivators and the colonial authorities tried to regulate the movement. It also led to the settlement of some of the nomads and hence accelerated the numerical decline of the Mbororo (Boutrais 1986: 146-48; Awogbade 1986: 216-17; Frantz 1981: 95-97).

It has been quite clear in our discussion so far that the colonial order had little use for nomadic pastoralism. It regarded it as anathema to development and either tried to force changes on it or, more commonly, left it frozen in time. Throughout colonial Africa agriculture was preferred and encroached on pastoral land (Gallais 1972: 363-64; Arhem 1985b: 19). Various ‘development’ schemes which tried to put pastoral lands into more intensive use while compensating the pastoralists with largely ineffective extension services ended in general failure and often led to further depletion of land resources (Arhem 1985a: 35; Sindiga 1984: 309). The tepid response of nomads to those schemes was taken as further proof of their resistance to change. It should be added, however, that, at least in the Kenyan case, colonial authorities, themselves, did not encourage the adoption of those innovations which were bound to clash with European settler interests.

In any event, the colonial period was, for nomads, one of diminished opportunities. Even when they did settle permanently, they did it as a response to restricted freedom of movement and an inability to maintain their traditional livelihood. A few households, especially of those appointed colonial chiefs, did become more sedentary and benefitted from new agricultural and commercial opportunities as well as pastoral ones but they were a small exception. For the great majority of households, greater opportunity meant, above all, the opportunity to return to traditional pastoralism. On a larger scale, only those pastoralist groups who had started to shift their economy to a greater exploitation of agriculture already before colonialism, as did most Fulbe and Hutu, could take advantage of colonial developments. With the notable exception of the Nandi, permanent settlement and economic change out of a perception of expanded opportunities was less common among segmentary pastoralists than among their state-forming counterparts and it contributed to a widening of the differences between the two types.

Post-colonial changes

The fate of pastoralist groups after the achievement of independence depended, of course, on the extent to which they were part of, or allied with, those groups who gained ruling positions in the new state. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the great variation and the fluctuation displayed over time in the
political fortunes of pastoralist groups in different states, the basic distinction between ‘state-forming’ and ‘stateless’ groups remained. Among groups who had been ‘stateless’ in pre-colonial times, the marginalization of the colonial period continued in the great majority of the cases. Among pastoralists who had ruled pre-colonial states, the outcome was more variable and, indeed, depended on the result of the struggle waged between different groups over the control of the ruling positions being vacated by the colonial power. Former state-forming pastoralists were active participants in these struggles. When they were victorious, they obviously continued to enjoy their privileged positions and were incorporated in the new authority structure, continuing the colonial trend. But even when they were defeated, they were not completely marginalized; they had to be taken into account as opponents and as such were attributed importance by other groups. They were still considered a threat, even with diminished power, and as such occupied central stage. Even in the most extreme cases of mass annihilation such as happened in Rwanda after 1959, they continued the struggle as exiles from across the border and, as witnessed in 1994, regained power after many years.

Looking specifically at the Fulbe, at certain periods and in some countries, such as Cameroon during the Ahidjo regime or Nigeria under the NPC-dominated government, the Fulbe were politically the strongest group in the country. They continued to occupy the top of the stratification ladder, exerted patronage on other groups, enjoyed economic privileges and were the primary beneficiaries of Northern and Islamic solidarity. Expanded opportunities brought further settlement and involvement in commercial networks. In North Cameroon, where the Hausa competition was less strong than in Northern Nigeria, the Fulbe were prominent among urban traders (Gondolo 1986: 312; Schultz 19834).

In other instances, the Fulbe lost the position (or never held it) in the country’s ruling coalition and at times were identified with the opposition. Following the resignation of Ahmadu Ahidjo in Cameroon and especially after the failed coup attempt against his successor, Paul Biya, the North in general, and the Fulbe in particular, were regarded as part of the opposition. In Mali, the Fulbe of Massina were generally in opposition to the first independent government formed by Modibo Keita and were not strongly represented in subsequent governments either. In Guinea, under Sékou Touré, the Fulbe were not only identified with the opposition but were a principal target of repression and persecution.

Such reversal of political fortunes had its obvious impact on the Fulbe’s standing in their own region as well. Traditional Fulbe chiefs found themselves under pressure from central government officials as well as in apprehension of educated elements within the local non-Fulbe people. In Futa Jallon, the Sékou Touré government went much further in eliminating past privileges. It abolished traditional chieftoms and Islamic courts, forced the sale of a certain quota of cattle through state channels, often below market price, and decreed that land would belong only to those who actually cultivated it, thus inflicting a severe blow to the economic system from which the Fulbe had benefitted since the Jihad. The Fulbe lost their dominant position in the local administration and the judicial system; they lost much of their livestock and the land which used to be cultivated for them by their former slaves and sharecroppers (Azarya 1978: 167-68, 178-90).

Despite these considerable losses, however, and even when their political
fortunes were at their lowest ebb, the Fulbe still enjoyed high ethno-cultural prestige due to Islam and to the memory of their past glory. This was not simply a self-attributed defiant pride in times of adversity; it was shared by other groups. Indeed, in Guinea, as opposition to the Sékou Touré regime spread, the Fulbe former ruling families regained prestige as alternative sources of authority (Azarya 1978: 196; Azarya & Chazan 1987: 124). Even when Fulbe were kept away from positions of power they continued to be cultural models for others. Even though they were not incorporated into the post-colonial political centre (except for a few individual token representatives) they were far from being marginal. They were all too present in the government’s mind as a threat and were, therefore, targets of special persecution.

In Mali, recent evidence has indicated increasing polarization within the Fulbe society between descendants of the traditional elite (the Weheebe) and the more commoner elements (the Jallobe) who did not have as diversified sources of income as the ruling class and remained more exclusively dependent on their cattle (De Bruijn 1992: 3-6). In the post-colonial period, the descendants of the traditional leadership seem to have maintained their position with minimal loss, mainly due to the religious and political positions they still occupy and their more diversified economic resources. Even though the Fulbe are not strong politically at the national level and the Fulbe chiefs have lost much of their power since independence, they are still necessary intermediaries between the government and the people and they use their political relations to their advantage. The commoners who do not have similar political ties and are more dependent on cattle have experienced much greater deterioration, as a result of the great blows that pastoralism has suffered in recent years (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1992: 49-57; De Bruijn 1992: 11-17).

Looking at non-Fulbe examples, in Rwanda, a violent revolution, in 1959, reversed the power relations between Tutsi and Hutu already before independence. At independence, in 1962, the government was fully in Hutu hands (D’Hertefelt 1962: 230). The kingdom was abolished, the king fled to exile and so did a large number of Tutsi who were subject to violent persecutions. The numbers of refugees grew rapidly in the 1960s and 70s with each new wave of violence against the Tutsi. Large refugee camps were set up for them in neighbouring countries (De Heusch 1966: 157) and they organized themselves as an armed opposition to the Rwandan government. In 1994 they succeeded in driving away the Hutu-led government forces but not before mass killings of a genocidal proportion were perpetrated, mostly against the Tutsi. The change of power brought a new wave of mass exodus, this time of Hutu soldiers and civilians.

Despite their recent defeat, the thirty years of post-colonial Hutu domination in Rwanda led to deep changes which would be hard to reverse, such as the final dismantlement of the clientship system and the abolition of the kingdom which upheld the traditional Tutsi domination (D’Hertefelt 1966: 436; De Heusch 1966: 149). By contrast, the new land tenure system enacted at that period, which sealed the Tutsi loss of privileges, might be more reversible. The changes in land tenure after independence were greatly simplified by the mass emigration of the Tutsi. Now that they and their descendants have returned, it remains to be seen how much of that land would be repossessed, especially since it is the Hutu who are now absent from their home region. The new Rwandan government formed in summer 1994 is officially headed by a Hutu in recognition of the
fact that the Hutu form the majority of the population, but the Tutsi control the armed forces and hence hold the key power positions in the new regime. The military and political fortunes of the Tutsi might change again but there is little doubt that they would remain key political actors unless a new wave of genocide would physically wipe them out.

Burundi did not experience the sudden reversal of ethnic power relations that characterized Rwanda. In the first decades of independence, Tutsi supremacy survived many upheavals, military coups and attempted coups, assassinations of prime ministers, the exile and later execution of the last king and the abolition of the kingship (see for example Kay 1987: 5-10; Lemarchand 1974: 11-18). In the 1970s these upheavals were also accompanied by large-scale violence perpetrated mostly by Tutsi against Hutu. A large number of Hutu fled Burundi to neighbouring countries where refugee camps were set up for them just as they were set up for the Tutsi who fled Rwanda (Kay 1987: 7; Lemarchand 1974: 18). Undoubtedly, the violent repression of the Hutu by the Tutsi in Burundi was driven by the fear that a large scale uprising of the Hutu against the Tutsi could follow the example of Rwanda. In recent years, Hutu reached top political positions in the country and held the majority of seats in the Burundi parliament. However, the Tutsi still dominate the armed forces as well as senior positions in the civil service and in professional, economic and educational institutions. In 1995-1996, a power sharing arrangement between Hutu and Tutsi-led parties broke down and plunged the country into renewed ethnic turmoil. Ethnic-based killings increased, Hutu residents fled the vicinity of the capital, Bujumbura, and fights broke out between Hutu-led militia and government forces (newspaper report 1994-1996). In July 1996, the Hutu President was overthrown by the military and replaced by a Tutsi. Despite the ascent of some Hutu to top political positions, the Tutsi have, so far, remained major power and principal protagonist the central political arena despite being a small minority in the population.

How did the formerly ‘stateless pastoralists fare in the post-colonial period? Not surprisingly, the general picture is one of political and economic decline and continuing marginalization. It is striking to see how little difference independence made with respect to the central government’s attitude toward nomadic pastoralists. Nomads continue to be considered impediments to development. They were considered uncivilized and uneducated. Their economy was seen as wasteful and they were blamed for the decline of land fertility and the spread of desertification. Post colonial governments followed their colonial predecessors’ policy of encouraging the settlement of pastoralists as they saw in it important economic and political benefits. They pushed for the commercialization of stock and tried to take over the land in order to put it into more intensive and more profitable use. Nomads clinging to their way of life saw their freedom of movement and their access to pastures steadily diminished. Agricultural encroachment at the margins of pastoralist land continued unabated (Arhem 1985b: 27; Campbell & Axinn 1980: 6). Most of those most adversely affected by these developments happened to be groups who had not established states and hence had not undergone considerable sedentarization and economic change already in the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

The literature is full of examples of post-colonial government attempts to induce or to force pastoral people to set-
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...report on pastoralist and nomadic peoples in Africa, the state has gradually become more involved in their societies, and this has often led to conflict. In many cases, the state has imposed policies that have not always been in the best interests of the pastoralists. For example, in southern Africa, the colonial government encouraged the establishment of cattle ranches, which led to conflict with the local pastoralists who were forced to move to less desirable areas. This conflict was exacerbated by the fact that the colonial government did not have a clear understanding of the needs and traditions of the pastoralists.

In the case of the Maasai in Tanzania, the colonial government implemented policies that led to the overgrazing of pastures and the displacement of the Maasai from their traditional lands. This led to a decrease in the fertility of the land and a decrease in the production of livestock. This was a result of the government's failure to take into account the needs of the pastoralists.

In Kenya and Tanzania, the relations between the pastoralists and the colonial governments were characterized by insecurity, mutual suspicion, and a lack of understanding of the needs and interests of the pastoralists. The Maasai represented an extreme case of dependency on livestock and little other investment. They found it difficult to gain from post-colonial government policies and, on the contrary, faced serious new challenges to their land and way of life. The Maasai lost both their agricultural and wildlife reserves, and the government's policies led to the destruction of traditional reciprocal ties.

The government's policies also had an impact on the pastoralists' ability to obtain grazing rights on that land. They were very reluctant to exercise those rights and prevent access to adjacent groups in order to conserve the traditional reciprocal ties. While group ranches did provide greater protection to their pastoralism than individual ranches, they were still resented by most Maasai as being an external imposition.

The threat of freehold tenure did not exist under the socialist regime of Nyerere in Tanzania but pastoralists, and especially the Maasai, faced other kinds of pressures. The government tried to regulate the pastoralist sector by launching livestock development projects and establishing ranching associations. Forced permanent settlement became a serious threat in the 1970s as part of the 'villagization' cam-
campaign pursued by the government throughout Tanzania, but the threat did not materialize as villagization projects were not seriously implemented and later dropped altogether (Jacobs 1980: 3-9; Arhem 1985a: 41). A stronger pressure derived from the government’s clear preference of wildlife conservation at the expense of pastoralists’ needs and the resulting restrictions on stock movement (see more below).

We should point out, of course, that there were also examples that ran counter to marginality. Most Kalenjin speaking groups did settle in the Rift Valley and were incorporated in the economic transformation of the area. They also came to politically dominant positions under the rule of Daniel arap Moi who was, himself, of Kalenjin origin. Among the Maasai, too, there have been some people who rose to important central political positions, including some government ministers and, in Tanzania, even one prime minister (Sokoine). The political ascendance of these Maasai individuals does not seem to have had the same effect on the collective incorporation of the group, at least not to the same extent as it did on the Kalenjin in Kenya under Moi. In the case of the Kalenjin, alignment with the central government and the share of its resources and privileges were much more widespread and were more actively encouraged by the regime. While such tendencies were less common among the Maasai, among them, too, there were some who did settle permanently, took up new occupations or adopted new practices of livestock management and were generally incorporated in the socio-economic changes brought to the area by the new political centre (Galaty 1980: 163). It is true that most permanent settlement occurred out of necessity, as a result of restricted movement, steady government pressure and land tenure policies. Nonetheless, the importance of land and its products rose, however reluctantly, and Galaty could note that “the dominant resource in defining Maasai social relations is becoming ‘land’ rather than ‘livestock’ in a way that ‘pasture’ never was” (1982b: 82).

In West Africa, the M’bororo, unlike their Fulbe kinsmen related to pre-colonial states, remained at the margin of post-colonial developments, as they did in the colonial period. In Northern Nigeria they were pushed out of densely populated areas. In Mali, they were given the choice to leave the fertile areas along the Niger river or take part in cultivation schemes (Santoir 1986: 200). As increasing numbers settled permanently, the total number of M’bororo continued to shrink. Looking at census figures ranging from the 1950s to the 1970s, Riesman estimated that from half to two thirds of Fulfulde speakers were fully sedentary. Of the rest, most were semi-sedentary and only slightly over 1% could be classified as nomadic (1984: 173, 177).

The Maasai, like the Samburu, the Turkana, the Herero and others, attracted curiosity for being different. Often they became, themselves, exhibits in the tourism industry, as part of natural reserves. A comparison with the Fulbe in this respect is, again, illuminating. In Fulbe-inhabited areas, the objects of tourist attraction were hardly the settled, state-forming Fulbe themselves but rather their nomadic M’bororo kinsmen or those pagan groups who inhabited hilltop villages where they could defend themselves better against Fulbe attacks in the pre-colonial period. They, and not the Fulbe, were the specimens of the ‘exotic’, of the different.

Some pastoralists learned to turn their marginality into profit, being photographed for fee, opening their kraal to tourist visits, performing folk dances or blood-drawing from cattle. Some were
also employed in the tourism service
business as hotel and campsite work-
ers, park attendants, scouts in nature
treks, sellers of souvenirs, etc. However,
because of the highly centralized nature
of the tourism industry, as most services
are prepaid outside the visit area, the lo-
cal population received only a small
share of its revenues (Sindiga 1984: 33).
On the whole, it seems that the growing
interest in conservation and the creation
of national parks and wildlife sanctuar-
ies worked to the disadvantage of the
local pastoralist groups; the needs of the
wildlife often took precedence over the
interests of the pastoralists who were
barred from entering large grazing areas
and were prohibited from hunting ani-
mals which attacked their herds, spread
them diseases or competed with them for
pastures (Sindiga 1984: 32-33; Arhem

In Kenya, the Maasai lost 3248 km
square to the Amboseli Game Reserve
and 1671 km square to Maasai-Mara
(Sindiga 1984: 32). In Tanzania, after hav-
ing left their land in Serengeti when it
was made a National Park towards the
end of the colonial period, they faced a
similar threat in Ngorongoro in the
1980s. The grazing area steadily shrunk as
the conservationist attitude stiffened
and the authority over the area passed to the
Ministry of Tourism and Natural Re-
sources. Pastoralists found themselves
subject to a series of rules and regulations
which did not apply to people living
outside the conservation area (Arhem
1985b: 9, 33-36, 55, 97). It should be
added that conservation measures were
directed against agriculture even more
than against pastoralism. In 1973 agricul-
ture was prohibited in Ngorongoro and
most farmers left the area. While the
pastoralists were freed of agricultural
encroachment, they also lost the trade
opportunities with the farmers (Arhem
1985a: 58-59; Arhem 1985b: 70). This in-
dicated, perhaps, that wildlife conserva-
tion was an even greater threat to
pastoralist existence than competition
from agriculture, especially when the
pastoralists in question engaged in
hardly any cultivation themselves and
strongly depended on crops supplied by
neighbouring groups.

Finally, as the nomadic pastoralists
who had not engaged in state-formation
in the pre-colonial period were the ones
most likely to have been pushed away to
areas with harshest environmental con-
ditions, they were also the main victims of
the severe drought and famine that
struck Africa in the 1970s and again in
the mid 1980s (Adamu & Kirk-Greene
1986: xiv). As with the rinderpest epi-
demics of the late 19th century and the
recurrent droughts of the colonial period
(see Campbell & Axinn 1980: 3-4), entire
herds of pastoralist groups were wiped
out, forcing them to settle in order to sur-
vive. As anxious herdsman could no
longer feed their stock they tried to sell
them quickly, which led to a plummeting
of livestock prices and further losses to
their owners (Swift 1977: 475). Many
pastoralists did take up agriculture by
necessity. However, under severe
drought conditions the agricultural
safety net also ceased to exist. Many died
of famine, others were pauperized and
became idle, destitute welfare recipients
in emergency relief centres. Diseases and
inadequate food supply caused further
mortality in those centres (Monod 1975:
63; Salzman 1980: 12; Swift 1977: 475).

While some pastoralists were thus
immobilized around welfare centres, oth-
ers travelled great distances in search for
work (or for water and pasture if they
could still hold on to some stock). They
offered their services as hired herdsmen
in areas less hit by drought or to large
herd owners who managed to preserve
them (usually buying from those who
could not afford to keep theirs and suc-
ceeding, through political ties, to get access to priority grazing and water). Indeed, one of the side-effects of the drought was a concentration of cattle ownership in fewer hands. Those who could not work as hired herdsmen worked in any other job they could find or moved to the cities in search for wage labour and enlarged the shantytowns that grew around them (Swift 1977: 475; Arhem 1985b: 43; De Bruijn 1992: 12; De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1993: 122, 136).

Whether accompanied by greater movement, as in the case of migrant workers, or less movement, as with those settled around relief centres, the result was usually the same: a further push to the margins of society. Having lost their livelihood, their culture and their self-respect, such groups found themselves at the outskirts of society where even bare physical survival was a matter of intense effort with uncertain results and depended, above all, on other groups’ willingness to offer them help or even tolerate their presence. Such pauperization has become an increasingly common occurrence in large parts of Africa and is, perhaps the ultimate marginalization of pastoralists in the post-colonial period. While no pastoralist group was immune to it, as the Tutsi refugees in Uganda or the Fulbe commons barely surviving in Mali could attest to it, the phenomenon was still more predominant among those pastoralists who did not take part in the profound social changes, such as new stratification and large-scale sedentarization that followed pre-colonial state-formation. A great extent of continuity from the pre-colonial to the colonial and post-colonial periods was thus displayed and current incorporation versus marginalization was, in most cases, found to be closely linked with the type of political relations that those groups maintained with the outside world in their pre-colonial past.

Notes

(1) This article was written while I was a visiting fellow at the National Museum of Ethnology at Osaka. I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Museum for their support. I would also like to thank Anatoly Khazanov and Georg Klute for their comments on earlier drafts of this work.

(2) For selective references on these groups see Hedlund, 1979; Jacobs, 1975; Galaty, 1980; Langley, 1979; Huntingford, 1953b; Dahl, 1979; Gulliver, 1975; Spencer, 1965; Spencer, 1973; Gulliver & Gulliver, 1953; Vivelo, 1977, etc.

(3) See, for example, D'Hertefelt, 1962; Vansina, 1962; Lemarchand, 1966; Trouwborst, 1962.


(5) Pastoralism refers here to an economy based on livestock raising which could be undertaken by sedentary, semi-sedentary or nomadic groups. Nomadism, on the other hand, refers to the extent of spatial movement of the groups in question. It is generally acknowledged today that the question of pastoral production is conceptionally distinct from that of the stability or instability of residence. Historically, there seems to be a trend toward greater association between livestock production and fixed residential location. On the relationship between pastoralism and nomadism see Frantz, 1982: 58; Monod, 1975: 32-33.

(6) The struggle to maintain Tutsi supremacy was waged mainly by relatively lower class Tutsi-Hima elements in contrast to the more aristocratic Banyaruguru. The Tutsi-Hima were more strongly represented in the army and were the ones most directly threatened by the Hutu rise. See Lemarchand, 1974: 12-18.
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Résumé

Proposant une distinction entre les pasteurs africains qui constituaient, à l'époque pré-coloniale, des États et les autres qui étaient organisés selon les structures segmentaires, l'auteur compare les Fulbe, les Hima et les Tutsi d'un côté avec de l'autre les Maasai, les Turkana et les Héréro. Il analyse ensuite l'influence de la formation de l'État sur la stratification et la sédentarisation, ainsi que sur le degré d'incorporation ou de marginalité de chaque groupe dans les sociétés coloniales et post-coloniales.

Resumen

Este artículo diferencia entre grupos de pastores involucrados en procesos de formación estatal en los tiempos pre-coloniales como los Fulbe, Hima o Tutsi, y aquellos grupos, que vivían en estructuras más segmentarias como los Maasai, Turkana y Herero. Comparando los tipos “Estado-formantes” y los “Sin-Estado”, se analizará el impacto de procesos de formación estatal tanto sobre la estratificación y la sedentarización, así como también sobre la incorporación diferencial o la marginalidad de cada grupo en las sociedades coloniales o post-coloniales.

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