“Meshamas – The Outcast in Bedouin Society”

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In Bedouin society the formal expulsion of an individual from the group is to declare him meshamas, which literally translated means «to be exposed to the sun.» The formal expulsion of tashmis (outcasting) in contrast to various forms of ostracization, is very rare in Bedouin society. Since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 to the beginning of 1980, there were only two cases among the Bedouin of the Negev in which a member of the khmas (co-liable group) was expelled from his group. One of these cases took place in 1955 and has been discussed by Marx (1967, pp. 239-41). The other case occurred in 1960 when a Sheikh’s son was expelled. Ben-David, in his book on the Gabaliya Bedouin of southern Sinai, emphasizes that outcasting rarely takes place (1981, pp. 34-35). The method for casting out a member of a khmas differs from one area to another, and there are even differences in the outcasting process between neighboring sub-federations of tribes.

Collective Responsibility

Bedouin society is organized in such a way that collective responsibility within the group significantly influences the pattern of life. Each member of a co-liable group knows that if he murders someone, or even kills him unintentionally without any premeditation, he creates a conflict with the injured co-liable group that can last for many years and might lead to blood revenge. In many cases of blood revenge it is not the individual who caused the murder upon whom revenge is taken. It can be, and there are many occasions when it is, a member of the murderer’s co-liable group -- somebody who is completely innocent and apart from the original argument is murdered in revenge because of collective responsibility. Although any member of the group can be killed for revenge, according to the principle of collective responsibility, the members of the injured group will usually try to kill a close relative of the murderer.

In many cases a killing may result from a minor disagreement between two individuals which develops into a fight. Arguments over watering places for herds in the desert are frequent. In one case described to me by a famous mediator in the Negev, two shepherds each claimed to have arrived first at a watering hole. After an exchange of name calling and cursing, one of the shepherds threw a stone that hit the second shepherd’s back. The slightly injured shepherd immediately attacked his «friend» and stabbed him with the shibriya knife. The young shepherd died from those wounds and the case led to a blood dispute. The injured family refused to take blood money and members of the co-liable group took revenge by murdering the first cousin (ibn amm) of the killer. There is thus a very heavy burden of responsibility on each member of the khmas. Each individual member of the group, is or should be, aware that his behavior or deeds might cause severe trouble to his own group. If his behavior results in the killing of a member of another co-liable group, one of his relatives will most likely have to pay for his thoughtlessness with his life. Even if the other group agrees to take blood money and the negotiation
of a peace settlement (sulha), such a process is time consuming, expensive and fraught with difficulties. For example, the (cease fire) conditions set by the injured group might include the condition that members of the killer's group will dismantle their tents and go into exile in a far away territory. Such a condition would clearly cause havoc with the social and economic livelihood of the group in question. Such a condition is extreme and not often demanded. However, other conditions are burdensome as well. If the injured group is ready to accept blood money, each member of the other group to whom the killer belongs must contribute.

The Decision to Outcast

In the Negev when a member of a co-liable group thinks the group should cast out one of its members due to his behavior, he brings the issue forward in discussion in the guest tent (shig) of the co-liable group. As with the concept of collective responsibility, if it is the khams, the co-liable group, that is the operative group in the outcasting process. It is then a majority decision as to whether the individual in question can remain a member or whether, for the sake of the group as a whole, he should be made an outcast. In cases where the decision is made to outcast an individual, the group members will immediately notify their decision to the neighboring tribes as well as to members of the other co-liable groups within the tribe. This notification takes the form of declaring the individual to be a meshamas, indicating that the group is not responsible for the action of this individual, and thus does not bear the burden of collective responsibility for him. Only after the notice has reached all of the tribes with whom they have relationships and interactions, is the act of outcasting recognized.

When an individual initiates the outcasting of a member of the group he does so by first meeting with several of the elders of the khams to find out if there is any support for his proposal. This initial meeting is, in effect, a lobbying for support. The general meeting takes place in the late evening in the shig, a place to which all group members can come to sit and drink coffee. No stranger can be present at such a meeting and it is most likely that any guest will show up after dark except in case of an emergency. Such a meeting can last for many hours and sometimes it takes several meetings before a decision is reached. Even though a majority of the khams may have already personally decided for tashmis (outcasting), there will be an obvious reluctance to make this view known without first hearing the opinions of the others. Minor differences of opinion may cause three or four consecutive meetings to be held before a decision is made.

Bedouin in Transition

The Bedouin of the Negev are in an advanced stage of sedentarization. This process began in the 1960s, and was intensified during the late 1970s. Salzman says that «Sedentarization is change, change from a more nomadic to a less nomadic way of life, from a nomadic to a more sedentary way of life» (1980, p. 1). Salzman discusses various assumptions about the nature of change and says that: «One such assumption is that socio-cultural change is irreversible, directional, and cumulative. Irreversibility is understood in two senses: that what has happened cannot be undone, and that a return to a previous state is impossible. Directionality is the sense that things change in a particular
direction and continue to change in that direction, sometimes in an accelerating fashion. The cumulative nature of change means that previous change has an impact on all that comes after, and each new change feeds into the following developments» (ibid.).

I shall show that these assumptions are valid in the case of the outcasting process of the Bedouin of the Negev. New developments in the outcasting process demonstrate Salzman's statement about the irreversible, directional and cumulative nature of change. Whether or not these assumptions are valid for other socialization aspects of the Bedouin of the Negev is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the fact that Bedouin society in the Negev is surrounded by Jewish settlements and has limited pastoral areas because of Jewish development of the Negev, seems to indicate that changes which are taking place in their social and economic life will not be reversed.

Marx describes the situation of the Bedouin of the Negev in the 1970s as follows: «By the 1970s, Bedouin derived only about 10% of their cash incomes from cultivation. Flocks of sheep and goats, which had formerly been the second major source of income in most households, had declined in importance and sheep raising was now practiced by a small number of Bedouin who owned relatively large flocks of several hundred head. Most Bedouin men had become wage earners, in factories, farms, and offices, and some had done well in business, mainly as building contractors» (1981, p. 120). In many cases jobs are secure. Most of the employed Bedouin are members of the Federation of Trade Unions and cannot be dismissed without notice.

The sedentarization of the Bedouin took on a new dimension after the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel was reached in 1979. As a result of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the area of the Negev became a much more strategic area for Israeli military purposes than was previously the case. In addition to other military activities, three air bases have been built in the Negev. One of the airfields is located in the Eastern Beer-Sheva plain, in the heart of Bedouin tribe homelands: «The outcome of these plans for the airfield was a draft law to expropriate an area six times that needed for the air base, and the proposal did not allow the occupants of the expropriated land recourse in the courts. Compensation for the land was to be nominal: however, each Bedouin household, whether it had owned land or not, would be entitled to a fully developed building site in one of the seven Bedouin towns to be established in the Negev» (Marx 1981, p. 121). In further comments concerning the plan to sedentarize the Bedouin according to the «Law for the Acquisition of Land in the Negev (Peace Treaty with Egypt) 1980», Marx advocates that the option to return to pastoralism should remain open, even if only few people take it up» (1981, p. 124).

These changes in the socioeconomic organization of the Bedouin, resulting from a situation in which incomes are now derived mainly from wages rather than from flocks and herds, have brought about a corresponding change in their socio-cultural structure. In particular this change has manifested itself in loosening the collective responsibility structure. The co-liable (khams) unit is no longer deemed by the Bedouin to be as important to their socio-cultural structure as it was in the past.
In discussing the nomads of Baluchistan, Salzman says that: «One noteworthy change is the decline of lineage corporateness and solidarity. This is manifested in a decline among lineage mates of coresidence, of mutual economic and political support, of identification with the lineage and of feeling of solidarity. Lineage mates live together less frequently and with members of other lineages more frequently. They are less prepared to provide economic assistance (to bail someone out of jail, for example) and even customary redistribution (as in ritual gift occasions, such as weddings, births, etc.). Political support is forthcoming only in more and more restricted contexts. Tribesmen no longer see their welfare as being so closely congruent in the way that it was felt in traditional times» (1980, p. 106). Additional to the sedentarization process, Salzman says that there are other factors which tend to undermine lineage corporateness and solidarity: «One is the decline of self-help as a means of social control. National government presence in the forms of rural police and courts circumscribes and limits the extent to which the tribesmen depend upon their lineage mates for protection and redress. A second is the economic inequality that results from differential participation in nontraditional economic sectors, such as the labor market and agriculture» (1980, p. 107).

The current sedentarization is a transition period in which the older generation, particularly the sheikhs and the heads of the khams, try to maintain traditional customs. In particular they are most anxious to maintain cohesiveness within the group. The younger generation, however, pushes toward economic integration with the wider society. Although both generations fear losing their identity as Bedouin and of becoming fully assimilated, for the older generation this is an overriding concern, while the younger generation is more willing to adapt to the modern economic system. In fact the Bedouin are actually «encapsulated» in the sense that they are cut-off from the traditional Bedouin society, but are not fully assimilated by the predominantly Jewish society surrounding them. On a continuum at which one end is independence and the other end is assimilation the encapsulated Bedouin society is somewhere in the middle.

In the past a member of a co-liable group could be cast out if his behavior caused, or there was reason to believe that it might cause, a breakdown in the solidarity of the group. For example, an individual who disregarded or paid no heed to the burden of collective responsibility would be a candidate for outcasting. Even under such circumstances, the decision to instigate the outcasting would not be taken lightly nor in a hurry, as witnessed by the fact of so few reported cases prior to 1980. However, between 1980-81 there were four cases in which members of the group were made outcasts. Those outcasts belonged either to the Sheikhs khams or to an important khams of the tribe. In all these cases no individual became an outcast because of traditional considerations, such as violating norms of collective responsibility. Instead, outcasting was deliberately used, in an unprecedented fashion, as a tool for increasing unity, harmony and solidarity among the co-liable group members. In contrast to its previous function, outcasting has now become a device to counter the disruptive influences on tribal organization resulting from the rapid changes in the socioeconomic and socio-cultural life of the Bedouin, as reflected in their rapid pace of sedentarization. These changes have thus led to a substantial change in the mechanisms of outcasting.
At the present time of hectic sedentarization of the Bedouin of the Negev, outcasting is used particularly as a warning to other members of the group not to disrupt the cohesiveness of the group. Such warnings are considered very necessary by the elders of the tribe because some of the young generation, especially those who have permanent jobs, feel that the collective responsibility system is a burden from which they should be relieved. The threat of outcasting is a strong pressure to conform to the wishes of the elders. Nobody wishes to become an outcast, for to be a meshumas is a social stigma — a mark of Cain that can make life intolerable for the bearer.

The use of outcasting as a warning to group members has parallels in other aspects of Bedouin life, especially in the issue of illicit sexual relationships. The killing of a girl or a married woman who has had illicit sexual relations serves as a deterrent in decreasing the danger of other girls acting as she has done. At stated by an informant, "If she is murdered, the others will think twice before losing their virginity" (Ginat 1962, p. 180).

The need to make a decision focuses the group on a problem common to all those who attend. The exercise of formal politeness when the group meets and the recognition that the members of the group gathered together share a common heritage, help each person see that the group is bigger than the individual. Group cohesion is also reinforced in decision making concerning blood revenge. In cases of murder the head of a co-liable group will try to find the best political situation to reunite group members. He will turn down the mediator’s request for a cease-fire period (atwa) and take advantage of the situation to congregate all the co-liable members for consultation and discussion. These gatherings undoubtedly contribute to the unity and solidarity of the group for exactly the same reasons as those given for a meeting concerning an outcasting proposal. The following six case histories of those who became outcasts from their khamas, begin with two cases that took place in the 1950s and 1960s within the value norms framework.

**Case History I**

Jed wa Abu Sulb 9 was the first case of a Negev Bedouin expelled from his co-liable group since the establishment of the State in 1948. The tashmis took place in 1957, after his co-liable group had on several occasions paid blood money due to his excessive behavior. Marx states that: "Gad wa Abu Sulb was 'haunted by bad luck', as one man put it. Time and again he became involved in bloodshed" (1967, p. 239). Between 1951 and 1957, Jed wa’ khamas had to pay blood money on three occasions.

The first time, circumstances led to Jed wa breaking a man's hand in a quarrel. The second occasion took place in 1953, when Jed wa went hunting and accidentally shot and wounded a shepherdess. After the shepherdess subsequently died from gangrene, his uncle had a long conversation with him, pointing out the possible repercussions if he did not behave with more care and responsibility in the future. But this warning was to no avail and in 1957 he accidentally killed a Bedouin from Northern Sinai. Jed wa’s uncle was the head of the co-liable group and felt that the group should not have to bear the burden of Jed wa’s bad luck. The uncle called all the male members of the khamas for a meeting and it was decided to make him an outcast. The act of outcasting Jed wa was justified when, later in 1959, he killed a
man (although the case was defined as self-defense). The elders of the tribe state that this is the first time in their living memory that a meshamas was involved in a fight which resulted in a killing.

The injured group tried to deny that Jedū'a was a meshamas. Marx emphasizes that the injured group «began to suspect that Gadū's agnates were still maintaining relations with him, and that therefore their announcement of expulsion had been deceptive» (1967, pp. 240-41). Even though the injured group suspected that the tashmis was not a real one, they could not do anything about it because the act of outcasting had been conveyed by the Abu Sulb co-liable group in the proper way.

Jedū'a faced a doubly difficult situation. Not only was he a meshamas with its concomitant social stigma, but also he was a target for revenge. Under these circumstances one can imagine Jedū'a wishing for the protection of collective responsibility. Jedū'a asked the authorities to help him in finding a shelter at some distance from the Negev, and for some time he stayed with a small tribe close to the Israeli Lebanese border where I visited him on several occasions. In case of murder or any other blood dispute between two co-liable groups, an individual, his nuclear family, or the entire khmas can ask for and receive shelter in a neutral tribe. The fact that most other tribes would be willing to help a co-liable group that was in trouble, results from a framework of reciprocity in Bedouin life. Every Bedouin knows that one day he might face the same situation and that he will be in need of shelter.

In the case of a meshamas, however, no one will give him asylum, for such an individual bears a mark of Cain. Nevertheless, Jedū'a stayed with this northern Bedouin tribe whose members did not have any contact with the Negev Bedouin, and who in this case chose to «shut their eyes» to the fact that Jedū'a was a meshamas. A more compelling reason was perhaps the fact that a member of this Northern tribe had taken shelter among the Negev Bedouin in 1951 and it was he who served as Jedū'a's host. Being in the North, Jedū'a had conflicting feelings. He knew that he was safe but missed the Negev. Eventually he left the Galilee and came back to the Negev, sleeping in different creeks, never remaining in one place for the entire night. Jedū'a was well aware that his life was in constant danger. He used to tell me when I visited him in the creeks where he hid, «I know that one day I will get it. I know that my fate is not to die a natural death. But only God knows the day. It is written up there when, where and how I will die.» Jedū'a was murdered, not by the group who had sworn revenge, but by a different group over a separate dispute that had nothing to do with the blood dispute in question.

Jedū'a's murder was not, however, the end of the blood dispute. As mentioned above, the injured group that planned to take revenge and kill Jedū'a, claimed that he was not really a meshamas and that the announcement to all the other groups in the tribe was a fake, especially since they learned that Jedū'a had married a member of his tribe, who had borne him a son. Immediately after Jedū'a's murder the elders of the injured group proclaimed that they would take revenge by killing his son when he grew up. Then at the end of 1981 they came up with a new idea. They wish to determine the truth about Jedū'a's outcasting. If they find out, what they suspect, that he was not in fact made an outcast, they will have ground for taking
revenge from the Abu Sulb co-liable group, or, more likely, to ask for blood money.

The Bedouin have several methods which purported to determine whether a man tells the truth or not. For minor matters they would ask the person to swear that he did not do the thing he was accused of doing. Because a Bedouin will not swear a false oath, his refusal is an indication of where the truth lies. For more serious matters the suspect would be asked to join the accuser in a trip to the tomb of a Holy man and to take an oath of innocence.13 Again, a refusal to comply with such a request is indicative. The most important test, however, is to lick a bar (plate) of iron known in Arabic as bisha. Several men conduct this ceremony and witness the accused wash his mouth three times in front of the accuser. Then the man who conducts the ceremony, the mebasha, pulls a metal plate out of the fire and the accused person licks the plate three times. If the accused person's tongue burns he is deemed to be guilty, but if the tongue remains without blisters the accused is declared innocent. The underlying idea is that the saliva of a guilty man will dry up, thus causing blisters on the tongue; whereas the saliva of an innocent man, who has nothing to fear, will remain and prevent the hot plate from causing a burn. Clearly, the temperature at which this plate is licked is of paramount importance and the skill involved in presenting the metal plate accords the mebasha a certain status.

At the present time there is no Israeli Bedouin mebasha. Neither is there one to be found on the West Bank. The last mebasha serving Israeli Bedouin was from Northern Sinai and died in the 1950s. He did not pass on the skills of his profession. There is one mebasha among the tribes of Northern Jordan and another one in Egypt. Since the peace agreement with Egypt, there have been two missions of Israeli Bedouin to the Egyptian mebasha. The injured party in the Jedū'a case, having heard about the visit to the Egyptian mebasha, has sent an indirect messenger to the elders of the Abu Sulb co-liable group telling them that they wish to test whether Jedū'a was a real meshamas, using the bisha method. To my knowledge, no response to this request has yet been made.

The case of Jedū'a's outcasting is a unique one. Nevertheless, it was done according to the social norms. It is a representative case of an individual who was a threat to the security and well being of the group, and who was made an outcast because of his irresponsible behavior. There were no political or other motivations involved in the expulsion.

Case History II

This case occurred in the mid 1960s. A son of a sheikh of a large tribe was involved in several incidents concerning relations with women. Although in most cases of illicit sexual relationships it is the woman who is punished,14 the co-liable group of the male offender may be punished as well. The young man involved was in his early twenties and married. After rumors about previous illicit relations, one relationship became public knowledge. The father asked one of the young man's brothers and one of his nephews to discuss the matter with his deviant son. But Na'īm, the Sheikh's son, did not promise to change his behavior. Even when his uncle, whom he greatly respected, approached him to change his ways he did not make any
commitment. However, when his cousin (another uncle's son) talked to him about the affair he was very coolly received and Na'îm told him to "mind his own business." This was especially aggravating because the cousin was considerably older than Na'îm. When the Sheikh, Na'îm's father, heard the report from his nephew, he was determined to have his son declared meshamas. The phrase "mind your own business" has a much deeper meaning than just an impolite approach. It contradicts the entire concept of the collective responsibility structure of the co-liable unit. Na'îm knew very well that in the case of a dispute resulting from his behavior, all the males of his khamas would immediately be involved. The Sheikh asked his nephew to keep the conversation with Na'îm a secret. When Na'îm became involved in another illicit amorous encounter, even though the female was a member of his khamas, the Sheikh decided to make Na'îm an outcast. Na'îm's tashmis was a very short process. Within a single meeting, although a long one, stretching from sunset until dawn, the members of khamas decided upon the tashmis. And by the end of the following two days this decision was made known to all the Bedouin of the Negev.

Even though the tashmis can be classified in the traditional framework, in the pattern for which the tashmis was culturally adopted, it seems that there was another more important factor that made Na'îm's father push for the outcasting. As a result of the upheavals of the War of Independence in 1948, many tribes previously resident in Palestine moved to territories which were under Jordanian rule. In many cases only sub-tribes (rubâ'), or even fragments of a khamas, or even just a lineage left for Jordan. There were instances in which first cousins and brothers became dwellers in two different countries - Israel and Jordan. Many members of Na'îm's tribe, some of whom belonged to the Sheikh's khamas, moved to the Hebron Mountains (the West Bank) and to the fringe of the desert northeast of Amman in Jordan. Those members of the tribe who stayed in Israel came under the jurisdiction of the Military Government which decided to join several sub-tribes to one of the largest tribes, the Ibn-Karir - the tribe of which Na'îm's father was Sheikh. However, the Sheikh did not have the charisma or the power of leadership necessary for so large a group and the sub-tribes that unwillingly came under his umbrella did not show any desire for integration in the large unit. Each sub-tribe emphasized its own identity. In the late 1950s and beginning of the 1960s some of the leaders of these sub-tribes applied to the Military Government asking for recognition as independent tribes, and requested that they be officially declared as sheikhs in their own right. Although the requests were later granted for some of the sub-tribes (such as the al-Afram in case history III), no request had yet been granted when the following circumstances took place.

In the spring of 1962 Na'îm's father took the initiative to expel his son. He first had informal talks with several of the elders, as well as with some of the young members of the khamas. By outcasting Na'îm, the Sheikh diverted attention from his internal problems relating to his lack of authority over the tribe. By taking such an action the Sheikh accumulated power, honor (sharaf) and prestige. Even though it was only for a short period, the Sheikh's guest tent was full of tribe members who came to shake hands with him for his courage in proclaiming his son a meshamas. Although this case may be classified in the traditional framework, we see here the beginning of the use of tashmis as a political weapon. There is no doubt that in this case the tashmis was promoted not just to protect the tribe or as a warning to other tribal members, but was used as a means to gain political power.
Case History III

The following case history involves the possible misuse of the tashmis. Before proceeding with the particulars it is necessary first to provide the tribal background of the actors involved. Until the War of Independence, the al-Atram was an independent tribe. However, after the establishment of the State of Israel the Military Governor attached the members of the al-Atram to the Ibn-Karir tribe. After 1949 the elders of al-Atram continually requested to become again an independent tribe and in 1978 the Authorities granted the group their desired independence. Ahmad became the Sheikh of the tribe. Most of the members of the tribe belong to the al-Atram descent group that over time split into two co-liable groups (khams); however, the Sheikh's khams remained the largest one.

In January 1980 Habib Ahmad al-Afram was announced meshamas even though he was not a threat to the security or well-being of the co-liable group. Habib was a member of a different lineage than the Sheikh, but belonged to the same co-liable groups. At the time of his tashmis he was 25 years old, married and had a baby daughter. His father had died when he was thirteen, and he was the eldest of three brothers. His mother came from a large co-liable group which formed a sub-tribe in the Ibn-Karir tribe. Habib's mother, Jamila, did not return to her natal family after the death of her husband. She preferred to raise her children among the al-Afram co-liable group, although she kept close contacts with the members of her family of origin. Jamila had a strong personality and through her contacts and influence, Habib, as well as his younger brothers, married close relatives of their mother.16

Habib has served in the Israeli army,17 and the uniform and personal weapon contributed much to his status among the members of the tribe. Even though Habib was quite young he was respected in his lineage. His agnates would often wait until he returned from his military duty in order that Habib could participate in discussions and decision making. Many of the young people from the other lineages of the co-liable group liked him and respected him.

In the fall of 1979, women from al-Afram claimed that women from the co-liable group to which Habib's mother and wife belonged, encroached on their territory and grazed on al-Afram land. The accused women denied this and a quarrel developed between the women of both sides. The situation quickly grew more serious and the men of both of the common folk intervened by calling in a mediator. After studying the details of the altercation, Habib expressed his opinion that his mother's co-liable group were in the right and that the women of his own descent group were in the wrong. The Sheikh of the al-Afram summed up the situation for himself as follows: his tribe had been recognized as independent for only a short period and there was a real need to promote cohesiveness amongst tribal members. In the normal course of daily events this was very difficult because most members worked for wages outside the tribal area, and the Sheikh's shiq (guest tent) was not used very often for discussions and meetings which could help promote cohesiveness amongst tribal members. The Sheikh determined that the circumstances of the quarrel could be used to promote cohesiveness and to this end he spoke to many of the khams' members privately and persuaded them that Habib's behavior could not be tolerated and that he should be made an outcast. Under no circumstances, he said, can a co-liable group member publicly support another co-liable group with whom one's own group is in dispute.
The tashmis took place on 12 January 1980. Neither Habib nor his brothers were invited to participate in the meeting (in the Sheikh's shiq) that concerned his outcasting. In the process of the decision making, the Sheikh took notes which were then summarized as an official document, signed by the elders of the co-liable group and by several witnesses. The paper was shown to Sheiks and heads of sub-tribes all over the Negev, as well as the contents of the document being conveyed by word of mouth among the tribes.

The Sheikh decided that even though it was his initiative to cast out Habib and his brothers, it would be more suitable if the official tashmis did not take place in his tent. The reasoning behind this is that the Sheikh not only belonged to the khamis but was also the head of the entire tribe. He felt that his shiq should be neutral and he therefore asked the Sheikh of the Abu-Karir tribe (to which the al-Atram had been attached before they received independent status as a tribe) to allow the official tashmis to take place at his shiq. Sheikh al-Atram signed the document as a witness of the outcasting and not as a protagonist. Those signing in the name of the khamis were of Habib's own lineage: two of his paternal uncles and Habib's father's uncle.

The meetings prior to the tashmis and the gathering for the decision making involved all the males of the co-liable group, even the young generation. Never before, or after the tashmis, did Sheikh Ahmad see such an attendance of members of his own co-liable group in his tent. Clearly, the event added much to his personal status, and indicated to all those present that the unity of the group was of paramount importance and that serious consequences would ensue if this unity was disregarded. Habib acted as if he did not mind being made an outcast and never left his home. However, in private talks I had with him he admitted that it was difficult to live among the Bedouin with the stigma of being a meshamas.

In the course of the discussions in the shiq some of the young members of the group claimed that they too thought that the women of the al-Atram who were originally at fault. The Sheikh, as well as other elders of the co-liable group, emphasized that the unity of the group comes first. And it is this unity that should have the highest priority in determining the actions and speech of any individual co-liable member. The important point being made here is that there must be a distinction between private knowledge and public knowledge, and the concomitant action that must arise from this distinction. In taking the outcasting course of action, Sheikh Ahmad succeeded in delivering his 'unity' message to the members of the tribe, especially to the young generation who might have felt inclined to act in the future as Habib had done.

Habib's case differs from the previous cases with respect to the basic principle of the tashmis. After Habib's outcasting became known among the tribes, it became the main topic of discussion in many shiqs. Several people who are well known as judges and mediators told me that the concept of the tashmis was devised in order to protect the group from any possibility that another member be killed or injured in revenge as a result of misbehavior by one of its members. In order to prevent such an occurrence, the groups can expel any irresponsible member by means of outcasting him. Some judges and mediators have expressed the opinion that the outcasting of Habib was a misuse of the tashmis.
This case was the first time that the tashmis was used in the Negev as a tool for unification. It was not only a punishment for Habib, but it served also as a warning to others, especially to the younger generation. The event was constantly discussed and argued in many of the surrounding guest tents because it brought into question the legitimacy of the Sheikh’s action.

At the end of 1981, about half a year after the tashmis took place, several dignitaries from other tribes came to the Sheikh’s tent and asked him to abolish the tashmis. The Sheikh agreed and after some months’ delay he eventually went with two mediators to Habib’s home to tell him that the tashmis was abolished. To demonstrate his decision he took the tashmis document from his wallet, tore it up and put the pieces of the paper in the fire pit. However, no effort was made to notify other tribes that Habib and his brothers were accepted back as full members of the khamas. Many elders and dignitaries feel that once a person is declared meshamas it can never be undone. This is the first case in the Negev, according to many Bedouin, that a tashmis was abolished.

Case History IV

Jamil was the Sheikh of a small tribe, the Ibn-‘Abada. During the 1948 War of Independence some members of the tribe moved to the Hebron mountain area in Jordon, while others remained on the Israeli side of the cease-fire lines. Jamil had three wives and quite a large extended family. He owned several hundred acres of land and two buildings in Beer-Sheva, in the Negev.

In the beginning of the 1970s the Israeli Government mapped the entire Negev for land settlement. The Bedouin were asked to indicate land they claimed to have possessed prior to 1948. Such claims had to be accompanied by information relating to the names of their neighbors with whom they had had common boundaries. As there was no land settlement at all in the Negev prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, the Bedouin did not have any documents that could prove ownership or possession. The Government’s proposal was that 50 percent of the land claimed by any individual, assuming that there were no conflicting claims on that specific land, would be recognized as land that belonged to that individual. As the Government had a sedentarization plan which involved building settlements for the Bedouin, the proposal was that each individual would receive 20 percent of the land in kind and the remaining 30 percent in money. The land to be received in the terms of the proposal would be close to the settlements.

The proposal also included a possibility to exchange land for irrigated land. One hundred dunams (one quarter of an acre) would be equivalent to one dunam under irrigation; the maximum amount of land that could be exchanged for irrigated land was four hundred dunams. Collectively, the Bedouins refused to sign any agreement for the Government proposal. While they agreed to the proposal regarding the 50 percent claim, they wanted at the same time to receive all of the land they owned under the proposal, and not part of its value in money. They also turned down the proposal of exchanging one hundred dunams for one dunam under irrigation.

Although most of the Bedouin refused the proposal, some individuals came to an agreement with the Land Authorities concerning all or part of the
proposa1. Sheikh Jamil Ibn-‘Abada, however, even though he urgently needed money, refused to sign an agreement under the above mentioned proposal. When he died in 1978 his oldest son ‘Oda, succeeded him and became the Sheikh of the tribe. In the summer of 1979 ‘Oda found out that one of his younger brothers, Salim (who was from a different mother), had secretly signed an agreement with the Land Authorities. Although at first ‘Oda thought that the agreement related to the brother’s share of the inheritance only, he learned later that his brother had signed for the entire land due to their late father. ‘Oda hired a lawyer to stop the transaction and at the same time decided to outcast his brother Salim.

In the first meeting in the shiq, ‘Oda told the members of the khamas that several years earlier, Salim had not obeyed his father over some matter, and that the father had had thoughts then about outcasting him. He pointed out that in Bedouin society land is a very sensitive subject, equivalent in importance to the sensitivity accorded to a man’s honor. ‘Oda argued that Salim’s action was worse than stealing from one’s own family and that the strongest sanction should be inflicted, in this case outcasting. There was no objection by the other members, and the tashmis took place.

In contrast to Habib’s case (case history III), the outcasting in this instance was pure punishment. Salim was a wrongdoer and was punished for his crime. However, the question arises as to whether this severe punishment was appropriate to the circumstances. In this case the punishment could not be said to represent a warning to others. Furthermore, while in Habib’s case the punishment was against action that effected the entire co-liable group, in Salim’s case his crime did not effect the entire khamas but only the Sheikh’s own family. In both cases there was not an outside threat to the co-liable group; and in both cases the meshamas belonged to the Sheikh’s co-liable group. This last point perhaps provides a clue to ‘Oda’s insistence on the outcasting. ‘Oda had only recently succeeded his father as Sheikh, and he was still young in years. The important consideration in determining his decision to outcast his own brother might have been that he knew that his personal esteem within the group and beyond would be raised by the taking of such a drastic step.

Case History V

Muhammad Da‘ud was a member of the Ibn-Karir khamas, who worked for wages in Jewish settlements. (See also case history II for events relating to this tribe.) He worked in a variety of jobs such as picking oranges and working in an industrial plant in Beer-Sheva. Working in the city, he met people from the criminal underworld and became friendly with some of them. He then began to borrow (to take loans) from different Bedouin who did not belong to his khamas or even to the Ibn-Karia tribe. Muhammad never returned the money and various people complained to his older brother about his behavior. Muhammad continued to borrow money and to not return it so often that it became public knowledge, as was his association with criminals.

Musa, Muhammad’s brother, then decided on a course of action to outcast Muhammad. As Musa was a member of the Sheikh’s co-liable group, any meetings concerning a proposal to outcast should take place at the Sheikh’s shiq. However, Musa was not on good terms with the Sheikh and did
not want the Sheikh to have the opportunity to call a meeting in his shiq on Musa's behalf. So, instead of asking for a meeting of his co-liable group all together, Musa spoke to members of the group individually. He first went to the elders of the khasms and told them that his brother's behavior constituted a potential danger to the khasms, and that Muhammad should be declared a meshamas. The majority of the members of the co-liable group whom Musa approached agreed with his interpretation of Muhammad's behavior and the concomitant sanction that was suggested.

However, the issue was never brought to a formal discussion within the khasms. Instead, Musa invented a new system of outcasting. He went to his brother Muhammad, tied his hands, and forced him to go with him to three different shiqs. At the same time Musa invited five (carefully chosen) members of his own kham to join him. He first brought Muhammad to the shiq of one of the most famous judges and mediators in the Negev, a man who belonged to a related tribe, a tribe from the same sub-confederation of tribes as the Ibn-Karir. (Thus, it could be interpreted that Musa went to an outsider who was not really an outsider.) Musa declared that Muhammad had been outcast and asked the judge to be a witness for this proclamation. Musa then continued to do the same at two other shiqs. Again, he carefully chose the Sheiks to whom he took his brother. In both cases the Sheiks' tribes had for many years been sub-tribes within the Ibn-Karir tribe, and only recently had they been recognized as independent tribes. One of the tribes was the al-Atran (see case history IV) and the other was the Shallala tribe. Once again, in both shiqs, Musa proclaimed that his brother Muhammad has been outcast, and asked the Sheikh in question to serve as a witness.

Musa's action was prompted by a feeling of shame concerning his brother's behavior. He had warned his brother about this matter of borrowing but not returning prior to his decision to outcast him, but Muhammad had taken to heed of the warning. It is common in Bedouin society to grant a loan without interest. The understanding is that the loan will be returned at the first opportunity. Muhammad had taken advantage of this custom to steal money. Apart from this obvious wrongdoing which had to be punished, Musa also concluded that his brother's contact with the Jewish criminal underworld would worsen and lead to a further deterioration in his behavior, a deterioration that might in the future have serious consequences for the group as a whole. He, therefore, decided that outcasting his brother would be the best solution.

Musa wanted to outcast his brother as fast as possible, but he was faced with a problem: there was no real unity in the Ibn-Karia co-liable group. For many years there had been a latent competition for leadership between three sub-groups of the khasms. The competition increased after the death of the former Sheikh (Na'îm's father in case history II). The authorities appointed the late Sheikh's nephew as the successor, but one of the brothers of the deceased Sheikh felt that he should have become the head of the tribe. There was also another possible contender, although he had never expressed the wish to become Sheikh. This individual was another nephew of the late Sheikh who worked in an important public position through which he had concentrated power.

Musa supported the late Sheikh's brother and used to visit his shiq very often. Knowing that neither the head of the faction he belonged to, nor
the nephew who had accumulated power, liked the Sheikh (to the extent that they would not enter the Sheikh's shig), Musa decided not to bring the issue of outcasting his brother to a formal khamas discussion. However, a more compelling reason may be found for determining why Musa acted the way he did in his brother's outcasting. Musa was well aware of the circumstances surrounding case histories II and III, for they were much discussed in Bedouin circles. He may well have concluded that the outcasting procedure was not in fact so stringent as was held by common folklore (as witnessed by the circumstances surrounding the two previous case histories), and that the outcasting of his brother, albeit under unusual circumstances stood a good chance of success.

Before Musa took his brother to the three shigs as described above, he made sure that he had the sympathy of the majority of the co-liable group members. He emphasized to the other members that his brother's actions might have serious consequences for the entire group. In fact, Muhammad was very careful. Within the Bedouin circle he played according to the rules of the game. Although he took loans, there is no specified time stipulated before one has to return the loan. If Muhammad was going to get into trouble, it would most likely be with his Jewish criminal companions and the police, and not with any Bedouin group.

As the Bedouin become more and more economically independent, they are increasingly exposed to the influence of the wider society. As this trend continues, cases are bound to arise in which individual Bedouins become involved with criminals and come under the influence of criminal behavior. Nevertheless, the promotion of lineage loyalty by the elders of the tribes will, it is to be hoped, go some way to prevent situations arising in which non-Bedouin criminal influence might jeopardize the safety of Bedouin tribal members.

Case History VI

Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, the al-Tamma tribe pitched their tents in the Western Negev. After the establishment of the State, the Military Governor moved them, as well as other tribes, to the Eastern Negev close to the cease-fire line with Jordan. About half of the tribe members chose to move to Jordanian territory, where they repitched their tents on the southern slopes of the Hebron mountains. In the late 1950s and early 1960s many of them became sedentarized. A member of the Sheikh's family was employed by the British Mandate Government and continued to hold his position as a Jordanian employee. He built a nice home in one of the towns south of Jerusalem.

After the June 1976 war when the cease-fire lines along the West Bank ceased to exist and everyone could cross the lines freely in both directions, there were many reciprocal visits from tribes on both sides of the ex-border. There were also some marriage unions between families that up to the time of the war had been separated by a border. Although these meetings and marriages created new alliances and renewed old ones, the tribe did not unite. Even on the co-liable group level, tribal members felt at a distance from the other group. However, they were all aware of the fact that from the point of view of collective responsibility there were no differences between them and any other co-liable group of Bedouin. The very
fact that for more than thirty years the tribe had been split between two
different countries where a hostile border prevented any official contacts
could not change the basic rules of collective responsibility of the khamms.

The Sheikh who was from the Israel side of the ex-border, tried to
strengthen the bonds between the members of his co-liable group. Such a move
was important for his status in a number of ways. Apart from the general
status of being head of a united, rather than dishunited tribe, there were
other status linked reasons. Those living in the West Bank had, for the
first time, to deal with an Israeli administration. Such dealings could
often be made easier by those who had lived on the Israeli side of the
border during the hostile border period. Apart from personal contacts, they
knew the ins and outs of dealing with Israeli bureaucracy. The potential
help afforded by the Sheikh in such matters added much to his status and
power.21 However, there were ups and downs in the relationship between the
two sides.

One much talked about crisis occurred as a result of a marriage
ceremony. The Sheikh’s brother, the Government employee in the West Bank
referred to earlier refused to give his daughter to the Sheikh’s son. He
preferred to marry her to a young man who was not a Bedouin but a villager
of peasant origin. The Sheikh of the al-Jamma tribe wanted to outcast his
brother for this insult; not only did his brother refuse to marry his daughter
to her first patrilateral parallel cousin, but also he married her to a
peasant. The Sheikh consulted with several of the elders of khan as well
as with other Sheikhs of other tribes. But everyone advised him not to
try to cast out his brother, and the Sheikh decided not to bring the issue
for a formal discussion. This event and the bad feeling that developed
between the two brothers because of this did not contribute to the unity of
the khamms. However, in the fall of 1981 another case concerning the al-Jamma
co-liable group led to a real tashmis.

Hasan ‘Abd Alla grew up in a town in the West Bank. From time to
time he visited the shig of the co-liable group which was in the same town
where he grew up. His father, ‘Abd Alla, was an old man and one of the
dignitaries of the tribe. He was a very respected mediator among the tribes
as well as the rural communities in the region. Hasan, however, was a
different kettle of fish. He used to sit often in the coffee-houses of his
hometown, as well as in Hebron and Beer-Sheva. He was lazy, had no desire to
work and adopted the system of borrowing money from different people and
never returning it like Muhammad in case history V. One of his cousins
determined that his behavior was unbecoming to the tribe, and initiated the
process to outcast him. However, before this decision had reached a formal
discussion in the shig, Hasan’s father became very sick. His illness lasted
some six months and then he died. During the period of ‘Abd Alla’s illness
the cousin did not pursue the outcasting course of action. During the first
days after ‘Abd Alla’s death many Bedouin came to the shig to pay their
respects. Most of the members of the co-liable group, from both sides of the
ex-border, were present in the shig for the entire five days. The mourning
served as a good opportunity for building more cohesion among the members of
the khamms. And, one of the oldest members of the khamms took advantage of the
circumstances to arrange a reconciliation between the Sheikh and his brother
over the marriage affair.
As soon as the forty days of mourning was over, the outcasting of Hasan came to the fore. The formal discussion was short and there were no objections to the tashmis. Every member of the co-liable group signed the paper on which the discussion notes were summarized. However, the outcasting must be viewed in the light of additional facts. The six-month period of 'Abd Alla's illness had a profound influence on the behavior of Hasan. He turned over a new leaf and no longer frequented the coffee-houses as before. Nevertheless, even though the reason for the outcasting could now be said to have disappeared, the tashmis still took place.

It seems that some decisive event was needed to cement the group unity that had developed as a result of 'Abd Alla's death. The mourning served as a fusion between the two sides of the tribe; the tashmis, albeit of the son of the deceased, strengthened this fusion of the different co-liable groups of the al-Tamma tribe. Usually the head of the khams is concerned with the cohesion within the group. But on this occasion because the closed border had prevented several co-liable groups from interacting with each other the tashmis contributed not only to inter-group cohesion but also to intra-tribal cohesion.

Discussion

Studies of non-Bedouin societies that are undergoing a process of sedentarization also shed light on social and political changes in the group structure. Bates, in his discussion of the Yoruk settlements, states that: «Political factions developed which, even though they were phrased as genealogically-based groupings, encompassed non-descent members in internally hierarchic, relatively stable conditions» (1980, p. 137). In his analysis Bates mentions that in recent years brothers and cousins took sides against one another in village politics. In one case «...one of the factions has come to ally itself more closely with the non-Yoruk section of the village, and has thereby gained control of the leadership» (1980, p. 138).

Another example would be the sedentarized Bedouin in Jordan. Abu Jaber and Gharaibeh, dealing with various aspects of Bedouin settlement in Jordan, state that: «The fruits of progress brought with them the loosening of tribal bonds and the weakening of the Sheikh's position. A new breed of leaders has emerged, who are educated and more aware of the Bedouin role in the national scene» (1981, p. 300).

The loosening of tribal bonds, the emergence of political factions and the decline of in-group solidarity are the reasons for the spate of outcasting in recent years. It should be noted that all the four cases of outcasting since 1979 took place in the Sheikh's co-liable group. The Sheikh's khams is the main link of the tribe. It is the focus of all the inter- and intra-tribal activities. Any Sheikh is at pains not to allow the khams to lose its cohesiveness, for if this were to happen, members of the group would lose their identity (and the Sheikh would of course lose his authority). Outcasting in this new situation of sedentarization is a mechanism for building cohesion within the group as well as for social defence. Outcasting is no longer a punishment of the individual, but increasingly serves as a warning for others. In this latter way it is a social defence.
This mechanism of outcasting fits Durkheim's theory regarding punishment. «But today, it is said, punishment has changed its character: it is no longer to avenge itself that society punishes, it is to defend itself. The pain which it inflicts is, in its hands, no longer anything but a methodical means for protection» (1960, p. 86). As to the importance of social cohesion: «Its true function is to maintain social cohesion intact, while maintaining all its vitality in the common conscience» (1960, p. 108). The two factors analyzed by Durkheim, the weapon for social defence and the importance of social cohesion, were the primary motivation in all the outcasting case histories presented here. The individual is no longer the cause of the outcasting process. And this is part of a wider ongoing process of dramatic change in the social life and organization of the Bedouin. In the past the Bedouin themselves would determine the most suitable form of punishment for any wrongdoing that took place within the khamis. In the past it was a common practice to tie a misbehaving member of the tribe to the peg of the tent. If a father or a cousin did this today, the individual against whom such an act took place would in all likelihood file a complaint with the police.

As a result of the sedentarization process and the close contacts that Bedouin now have with the outside society, there are more and more conflicts between the law of the State and the «law» of the social organization of the khamis. By adopting the new mechanism of outcasting, the ideology of the tashmis has been changed. This new ideology now has to be adopted within the social behavioral pattern of the Bedouin. Dealing with the subject of complementary opposition, Salzman refers to the issue in question as follows: «The actual pattern of behavior found must not only be compared with the pattern asserted by the ideological norm, but it must be placed in the range of possible behavior patterns. This is because it may be quite as significant that certain patterns do not emerge as it is that others do emerge» (1978, p. 66).

We would expect some differences between ideology and behavioral norms in every society, but if the gap between ideology and behavioral norms become too wide, then the ideology must change. The gap between the value norms and the behavioral norms regarding the tashmis have become very wide. The Bedouin, thus, now give a new interpretation to the concept of the tashmis. In times of stability, they now say, the co-liable group can tolerate some deviation of an individual's behavior from the group's ideology; but in times of instability, in times of rapid changes in the economic, social and political structure and tribal organization, the group and especially its leaders are very sensitive to any deviation that might influence the behavior of others in the group.

Peters (1967) argues that we should not accept Bedouin ideology as an accurate picture of their political system. For where their interests are not in accord with lineage solidarity, their loyalties also are not to their lineage. Peters notes that such conflicts often arise in cases where alliances are based upon matrilateral and affinal networks. For example, Habib's alliance via his mother and wife were based upon matrilateral and affinal relationships and interactions (case history III). But once there was a conflict between the two levels of loyalties (the khamis' patrilateral loyalties, and the matrilateral and affinal loyalties, which in Habib's case lay in the same genealogical line), the Sheikh, because of in-group considerations,
felt that he had to protect the khams’ interest in order to reach a higher degree of cohesion within the group as a whole. The tashmis in Habib’s case was a safety value for protecting the khams in the sense that if more members of the group behaved as the meshamas had behaved, the co-liable group would disintegrate as a corporate group.

Earlier on in this paper I stated that various assumptions concerning socio-cultural change, referred to by Salzman are valid in the case of the new developments in the outcasting process of the Bedouin of the Negev. The large increase of outcasting outside of the traditional value norms framework; the recognition that the outcasting procedure can be changed to suit individual circumstances; and the stated change in ideological thinking of the purpose of tashmis all indicate that this particular social aspect of Bedouin life has changed. This change is irreversible because the Bedouin themselves cannot go back to viewing the outcasting procedure only in the value norms framework; thus a «return to the previous state is impossible» (Salzman 1980, p. 1). The case histories indicate that a change in the procedure is taking place in a particular direction, namely, that outcasting is becoming more and more a political weapon, and that change in the procedure is taking place cumulatively as witnessed by the invention of outcasting procedures in response to the particular requirements of the case in hand.

However, this conclusion must be tempered with a word of warning. Salzman states that «... a shift (in customary practices) in the direction does not by any means preclude a shift back as the circumstances change, on the contrary ... a shift back is necessary and to be expected» (1980, p. 6). Nevertheless, we see in the outcasting changes a certain discreteness and absoluteness in the sense that a boundary has been crossed, and a new nature of the phenomenon now appears (Salzman 1980, p. 2). The points made in this concluding section concerning the irreversibility of change in the outcasting process must also be considered in the light of the general changes taking place in the social and economic structure of the Bedouin of the Negev as they become sedentarized at an accelerated pace.

Within a period of two years, there were four cases of outcasting, compared with two cases that took place within a period of 37 years prior to this two year period. One may speculate that if other co-liable groups are to adopt outcasting in order to protect the group and increase cohesion whenever there is a threat of a decline in khams loyalty, the social effects on the individual of being a meshama will change as well. In other words, the stigma of being an outcast will diminish as the group begins to recognize the real reasons behind the increase in outcasting.

FOOTNOTES
1. The term «co-liable group» was coined by Marx in Bedouin of the Negev (1967). It refers to the khams -- the group formed by all descendants of one ancestor to the fifth generation.

2. See Ginat, «Blood revenge in Bedouin society,» and for all other textual references to blood disputes.
3. For a full exposition of the role of the mediator see Ginat, «The role of the mediator: with special reference to blood disputes.»

4. The word another is stressed because if the killing is within the same co-liable group, different rules and procedures apply. In the case of killing or premeditated murder within the kham, there is no revenge or payment of blood money. Instead the person who caused the death of his relative leaves the area where the group is situated and goes into exile. It is usual for this person to stay with another tribe, at some considerable distance from his group's encampment. The length of time of the exile is not specified. The elders of the kham make this decision later depending on the circumstances that led to the killing and any influencing factors.

There have been instances where the father, son or brothers of the killed person (the closest relative) initiated the termination of the exile. When the murderer goes into exile he gives his closest unmarried female relative to the closest kin of the person who was killed (i.e., his daughter, or sister to the deceased father, brother or son). The female lives with that person until she gives birth to a male offspring. This act is done in order to compensate the family for their loss. After giving birth the woman may return to her natal family. However, in most cases, if the relationship was satisfactory, a marriage is arranged. The bride price is usually about the half of the regular price. This is because the woman is no longer a virgin, even though it was the husband who deflowered her. When the marriage takes place the exile of the murderer is terminated.

5. See Ginat, «The Role of the Mediator.»

6. The situation is different among the Bedouin in Sinai. Marx describes the situation there as follows: «Jobs are not secure, and a Bedouin may be dismissed without notice. The unpredictable political situation adds another element of insecurity. As a result, Bedouin consider their work to be temporary ...» (1980, p. 115).

7. The author wishes to thank Professor Phillip Salzman for his suggestion of the term and concept of «encapsulation» in this context.

8. For a full exposition of social stigma, see S. Giora Shoham and Giora Rahav, The Mark of Cain (1982).

9. The names of characters in all the case histories presented here have been changed except for the case of Jedū'a Abu Sulb. Marx, in his discussion on the Abu Sulb co-liable group, refers to the case using the real name. See Marx, Bedouin of the Negev, pp. 238-42. This case history has also been analyzed from the blood revenge point of view in Ginat (1983).

10. In the years 1960-63 I worked part-time with the Bedouin, in the Arab Department of the Histadrut (The Trade Union Federation). I helped obtain a job for Jedū'a before and after he stayed with the Northern Bedouin.
11. Every member of a group that is granted shelter is called tanib. Tanib literally means the cord of the tent connected to a peg. Those seeking the protection of the tent-dwellers pitch their tents by continuing the line of tents of the group that is to play host to the refugee. The cords of the first tent of those asking for shelter are tied to the last tent of those who offer shelter. When anyone comes to ask for shelter for himself he is called dakhil. He holds on to the central pole of the tent and asks for asylum. (The verb dakhal means to enter.) The person seeking asylum only for himself is seated in the shiq (that part preserved for hospitality) and there he spends the night. He is thus taken into the host's home and enjoys his protection. Robertson-Smith (1966, pp. 48-49) provides additional information regarding dakhil and tanib.

12. During this period, the 1950s, there were severe restrictions on movements from one part of the country to another, due to the general security situation. These restrictions were only lifted in 1966.

13. For a description of the tombs of holy persons and saints, see Tewfik Canaan, Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine.

14. See J. Ginat, «Illicit Sexual Relationships and Family Honor in Arab Society.»

15. There were about 65,000 Bedouin in the Negev prior to the 1948 War. After the establishment of the State there were about 13,000 Bedouin within the boundaries of Israel. For the names of the tribes see 'Aref al-'Aref (1934) and Marx (1967).

16. For women's power in decision making regarding marriage of their children, and mother-son relationships, see Ginat, Women in Muslim Rural Societies, pp. 170-72, 185-91.

17. The Israeli authorities do not draft Arabs to the army. However, there are many Bedouin volunteers, most of whom are accepted.

18. The tashmis document has been translated from the Arabic as follows: On this day, 21 January 1980, group No. 1 was at the home of Sheikh Abu-Karir. (The names of the three relatives that signed the document are specified as having attended.) The members of group No. 1 cast out the members of group No. 2 -- Habib and his brothers -- according to the Bedouin tradition. Therefore from this day we (members of group No. 1) are not responsible for them (members of group No. 2) and they are not responsible for us - not in any illegal event and not in any case of a killing of a person of even a baby.

At the request of group No. 2 (those who were cast out), if a member of group No. 1 interferes in the matters of group No. 2, they will pay a fine of IL 100,000.

The document is signed in the presence of members of group No. 1.
Signatures of three witnesses

1) Sheikh al-Atram
2) Mediator of Abu-Karir tribe
3) Mediator of Abu-Karir tribe

Signatures of the three members of Habib's lineage (who officially cast out Habib)

1) ____________________________
2) ____________________________
3) ____________________________

Comment

Habib told me that he and his brothers were never invited to attend any meeting, including the official outcasting ceremony in the tent of Sheikh Abu-Karir. Habib claimed that he never asked for any money as a fine in case members of his khams interfered in this matter. He knew first of this clause only when he received a copy of the document.

19. Private knowledge are the real facts that the individual feels or knows are the right ones but which, for the interests of the group to which he belongs, he must not make public outside the group. Public knowledge is the revealing of these facts to others outside the group and by so doing reduces the effectiveness of the group, or in this case weakens the group's position vis-à-vis the other group. The recognition of this dictation and action in accord with it is part of the individual's collective responsibility to his group.

20. The stranger in Simmel's terminology refers to a person who is simultaneously an insider and an outsider. The stranger is someone who does not originally belong to the group, which gives him the status of an outsider; and someone who «imports qualities into it (the group) which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.» Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms. In the circumstances presented here, the mediator is a member of another tribe within the same sub-confederation of tribes.

21. See Ginat, Women in Muslim Rural Societies, «Furthermore, parents of the West Bank girls encouraged marriages with Israeli Arabs as they wished to establish contacts in Israel. They often depended on the connection of their new affines both for jobs and for smooth contacts with the authorities,» pp. 131-32.

22. Between 1948 and 1979. From data I gathered from different sources I have learned that the last case of tashmis among the Negev Bedouin took place in 1942.

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